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ABSTRACT
Increased experience in fisheries cooperatives of devel-
oping countries has called into question a long-held presump-
tion about their desirability and feasibility. In this
context, this study attempts to reformulate the cooperative
approach for small-scale fisheries in a realistic policy
framework. First, past failures of fisheries cooperatives are
analyzed from three different angles: the uniqueness of the
fishing industry, systems intrinsic to the cooperative, and
development policy. Second, various possibilities of building
viable cooperatives are explored by introducing two key con-
cepts: the strategic option and the operational option. On
the one hand, the strategic option implies that it is impera-
tive to integrate cooperative policy with overall fisheries
development strategies in each country. With this regard,
seven schematic fisheries development models are derived from
agricultural as well as fisheries development experiences. On
the other hand, the operational option indicates the range of
policy choices with which to identify the most suitable co-
operative format to locality-specific conditions. The author
suggests that fisheries cooperatives in developing countries
be restructured free from obsession with ready-made cooperative
models. Finally, emphasis is placed on the need for inter-
disciplinary and international cooperation to broaden the
scope of fisheries cooperative studies in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this study is to explore a realistic approach
for organizing viable cooperatives in the small-scale
fisheries (SSF) sector of developing countries. Fisheries
cooperatives have long been regarded as an indispensable means
to modernizing the socio-economic sphere of SSF , and devel-
opment assistance agenc~es and national governments have made
considerable attempts to introduce them in peasant fishermen's
communities. Yet the results have largely been disappoint-
development strategies for future cooperatives remain in-
ience from all corners of the developing world indicates what
sufficient, both quantitatively and qualitatively, but exper-
ing. Although there are cases of successful cooperative devel-
opment, such as in Korea, much evidence clearly indicates that
past cooperative approaches need to be critically re-examined
--including the fundamental question of whether cooperatives
are really desirable and feasible for SSF. Efforts conceptual- /
izing fisheries cooperative problems and thereby providing
I
I
\
Pollnac (1982) has called the "ma s s i ve failure " of fisheries
cooperatives. What makes it more difficult to deal with the
cooperatives problem is that the findings and suggested solu-
tions in empirical studies tend to be piecemeal and sometimes
even contradictory (Obern et al., 1981; Johnston et al., 1982,
p. 169). As a combined result of inadequate theoretical per-
spectives and confusing empiricism , a pessimistic feeling has
1
2corne to prevail among practioners about the use of coopera-
tives. Today, the cooperative is so often exposed to both
explicit criticism and implicit cynicism that the very attempt
t~ revitalize the cooperative approach might be viewed as ob-
solete.
It seems to me, however, that the current pessimism, as
well as the optimism which surrounded cooperative policy in
the 1950's and 1960's, does not necessarily stand on firm theo-
retical ground, probably because it has gradually infiltrated
to the circle of fisheries development professionals without
provoking a notable debate among them. Furthermore, alterna-
models to the cooperative have received
\
t i v e organizational
neither sufficient elaboration nor experimentation. For
instance, although Ben Yami's (1980) community fisheries center
(CFC) concept represents a rare example of concrete proposals
substituting for the narrowly defined cooperatives, it appears
to have a long way to go before the ambiguities are eliminated
and its operationality is well established.
discuss this concept in Chapter I.)
(We will further
In short, the complex situation is such that there is no
longer much enthusiasm for the cooperative, but alternatives
are not readily available; and everybody admits that coopera-
tive-like organizations, if not exactly the cooperative, are
certainly needed for SSF. It may be said that the fisheries
cooperative issue is at a conceptual deadlock. It is probably
beyond any single person's capability to break this deadlock,
3and even if that is possible, it may very well be one's life-
work.
Bearing in mind the immense difficulties of the issue,
we can positively state that the first step must be to estab-
lish an analytic framework from which we can better understand
the structure of the issue. Specifically, we have to start
with an appropriate analytic framework to examine the effec-
tiveness and limitations of cooperatives in the unique setting
of SSF development. Without such a framework, the cooperative
problem will remain an ugly entanglement of mistakes, con-
straints, and failures. Chapter I will therefore concentrate
on this task; it will attempt to derive an analytic framework
by spotlighting problems of fisheries cooperatives from three
different angles--namely, the uniqueness of the fishing in-
dustry, systems intrinsic to the cooperative, and development
policy. My intention is not to restate negative evaluations
of the past cooperative experience, but to specify the struc-
ture of the failures in terms of the origins of the problems.
Chapter II, composed of four sections, will be the most
essential part of this thesis. The chapter will present basic
models for building cooperatives focusing on the strategic
functions of cooperatives in the broader picture of fisheries
development strategy. Agricultural experience suggests that
cooperatives must be designed in such a way that they are con-
sistent with the overall strategy of development, so the
chapter will include a discussion of the following questions:
4What kind of strategic options does SSF development have both
at present and in the future? How can cooperatives be consis -
tent with and promote such development strategies? What poten-
tial pitfalls can we predict while cooperatives are being re-
modeled to perform these strategic functions?
Chapter III addresses another concern in designing co-
operatives--that is, the finely detailed models are ironi-
cally often impractical in light of human, financial, and
other types of constraints prevailing in developing countries.
On the one hand, the models should be simple enough to allow
policymakers and local participants to comprehend the basic
objectives of cooperatives and the key processes by which to
achieve them. (This is exactly the context in which we will
develop our discussion in Chapter II.) On the other hand, the
models should be flexible enough to enable cooperatives to
continuously adjust to locality-specific conditions. In order
I believe we can
will consider what I would like to call "operational options"
(not strategic options as in Chapter II).
) to cope with these seemingly contradictory requirements, we
derive considerable flexibility in cooperatives--not only in
the planning stage, but also in the implementation process--
from various combinations of their forms and organizational
principles . For example, a cooperative can be set up as a
community organization or, alternatively, as a strictly occupa-
tional guild of fishermen, and there are a great many inter-
mediary forms between these two. Analogously, while strategic
5options constitute the infrastructure in building cooperative
models, operational options discussed in this chapter somewhat
resemble a superstructure based on the infrastructure.
The same chapter will, also summarize the discussion and
make a few suggestions for the future role of fisheries co-
operative studies. Any social issues are inherently open-ended
since the issues themselves develop over time, and their struc-
ture quite often undergoes qualitative transformations. For a
student of the fisheries cooperative (which is a typical social
issue) to claim that his study is conclusive is undoubtedly
self-defeating. In fact, my research is far from discovering
a solution to the problems of the fishing cooperative; on the
contrary, I would be more than satisfied if I could help in-
stigate more active discussions about cooperatives in the
context of fisheries development.
The development of fisheries cooperatives is demanding
but challenging, both in theory and in practice. For the time
being, it is naive to believe that we can get rid of the pains-
taking process of continuous reexamination and redesign of the
models and approaches. Therefore, I will conclude this thesis
with a request that, in the future of fisheries cooperative
development, cooperative efforts be made between policy plan-
ners and academicians; between economists, sociologists, and
fisheries technologists; between Westerners and Easterners;
and between peoples from developed countries and developing
countries.
CHAPTER I
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEMS OF
FISHERIES COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND
Looking back on past trends of fisheries development,
we can easily recognize that SSF has been given more emphasis
since the 1970's. Although large-scale or commercial fisher-
ies (LSF) have traditionally enjoyed and still enjoy mainstream
status as a subject of development projects in terms of finan-
cial turnover, the idea that SSF should be given a much higher
priority has gained consensus in both development assistance
agencies and academia (World Bank, 1982; Pollnac, 1984).
Moreover, governments of developing countries are beginning to
see the adverse effects of leaving SSF behind in favor of
spectacular LSF projects, which have often turned out to be
too ambitious and ultimately unproductive. Indonesia's recent
decision to ban trawl fisheries in its substantial waters to
protect the interest of small-scale fishermen dramatizes the
reversed undercurrent in priorities between SSF and LSF
(Sardjono,' 1980). Two naive assumptions widely held in the
early stages of LSF development were that increased employment
6
7opportunities would, in the long run, benefit small-scale
fishermen, and that the demonstration effects of modern LSF
technology would induce technical improvements in SSF and thus
pull it into the development process as well (Panayotou, 1980).
Although there are some factors that make it difficult to judge
the validity of such assumptions, reports from developing
countries not only frequently disprove them, but also attribute
to LSF development a considerable share of responsiblity for
the ever-deepening plight of SSF. Highly productive commercial
fishing boats have pushed less productive SSF out of the econ-
omic margin and damaged coastal fishing grounds traditionally
utilized by SSF (Panayotou, 1980; Alexander, 1975). Besides
the direct threats from LSF, the processes of industrializa-
tion and urbanization in many coastal areas of developing
countries have worked against SSF by causing ecological damage
to their fishing grounds. In addition, one of the most serious
problems has stemmed from within SSF: excessive fishing ef-
forts resulting from overpopulation began to dissipate even a
meager economic return from SSF (Lawson, 1977). Over-fishing
is a real risk in a number of countries--marginal production
per capita notwithstanding. As Troadec (1983) has noted,
Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent are the most notor-
ious, but similar concerns over SSF over-fishing have been
raised throughout the world.
Such critical issues concerning SSF have necessitated a
revision of policy priorities in favor of SSF and have helped
8people to realize its long overlooked merits. For instance,
SSF relatively easily provides landless farmers and other
rural poor with employment opportunities, at least for the time
being. When it is clearly predicted that the agricultural sec-
tor of low-income countries must continue to supply most of
the new jobs in the coming years (Loup, 1980), these countries
seem to have few alternatives but to expect SSF to share the
burden, no matter how irrational such a policy is from an SSF
standpoint if SSF is already saturated. Lawson (1977) has
stressed that the collapse of SSF would have devastating
effects in conjunction with problems of urban/rural migration.
Furthermore, SSF is less capital-demanding and less dependent
upon foreign technology and imported materials than LSF is.
Fuel prices increased drastically in the energy crises of the
1970's, and the subsequent deterioration of the balance-of-
payments in non-oil-producing developing countries made econom-
ic conditions less favorable to LSF and therefore relatively
favorable to SSF. Finally, the legal constraints of 200-mile
EEZs, as a result of the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, have
\ practically terminated the growth potential of LSF in countries
with narrow EEZs and those already having fleets disproportion-
ately large to the size of their EEZs.
A tendency in the theater of development theory also
contributed to the new emphasis on SSF. Basic Human Needs
(BHN), a relatively new concept of development which gained
recognition in the 19705, helped shift the focal point from
9LSF to SSF by arguing for a straightforward upgrading of the
standard of living at the grass-roots level. Although a
thorough investigation of BHN is beyond the scope of this
paper, the rat ionale.. behind the concept can be summar ized as
follows (Ruttan, 1984):
- The basic needs for the rural poor measured in nutri-
tion, elementary education, health care, and such can
be met with relatively low levels of per capita income.
- Expenditures directed at achieving the BHN are, con-
trary to purely consumption-oriented appearances,
high payoff investments for long-term development.
Among successful examples of the first premise is the highly
publicized Sri Lankan case, where "its life expectancy is one
and a half times, its literacy rate nearly three times, its
infant mortality rate one-quarter" the figures for countries
with a similar income level (Loup, 1980, p. 136). For the
second premise, Taiwan's successful efforts to establish a
mass educational system of high quality can be taken as an
example of the high payoff investments which later led to re-
markable economic growth (Lele, 1981a).
As usual for development theories drifting "fad to fad"
over several years, BHN is no longer the mainstay among devel-
opment specialists. The BHN approach was criticized for its
excessive focus on consumption--in other words, for its ne-
glect of income-generating components--for problems surround-
ing selection among different needs, and for naive assumptions
10
on the administrative apd political capabilities of Third
World countries (Loup, 1980, p. 127-138). However, although
I am unaware of any studies which purposefully discuss the
implications of BHN to fisheries development, the impact of
BHN upon the direction of fisheries development could have
been substantial. Unlike agricultural development, for which
rural community development was the central theme as early as
the 1950's, the focus of fisheries development has been largely
confined to the technical field. About this conspicuous tech-
nical inclination--I prefer to call it technical bias--
Emmerson wrote the following:
The most serious and widespread weakness in
artisinal marine fisheries development is a
preoccupation with means to the neglect of
ends . Narrow questions (how to intro-
duce a new boat, motor, or net) have tended
to absorb attention that should have been
spent on broader ones (why the volume of fish
production should be enlarged at all) (1980,
p . 1).
The technical bias characterizing the basic orientation of
past fisheries development had a direct link with the LSF bias
since LSF could readily accept modern technology introduced
from developed countries without much bothering about social
considerations. A convenient assumption frequently attached
to LSF development was that technical feasibility was synony-
mous with social desirability. As a result, SSF was hidden
behind the ' gr owi n g shadow of LSF, and even when development
efforts were targeted to SSF, the range of activities usually
extended no further than the improvement of fishing technique
11
and gear. However, as the focus of rural development theory
gradually shifted from cap ital-intensive, production-oriented
"projects" to administrat ive, people-oriented "programs"
(Korten, 1980)--typically in BHN approach--its influence upon
fisheries was felt, so that SSF instead of LSF, and fishermen
instead of fish, began attracting attention. In summary, a
reappreciation of SSF can be said to have originated in the
retreat from an overemphas is on LSF and the influence of chang-
ing development theories, notably BHN.
The growing consensus on the importance of SSF has not
proceeded further, however. Instead there remains a frustrat-
ing stagnation in professional circles centering around the
critical point of whether we can realistically expect self-
sustained socio-economic as well as technological development
in SSF. Of the few substantial studies undertaken in the field
of SSF, most remain introductory and tend to pose a lot of
questions without providing answers. Of course, some lessons
have been learned through three decades of experience: e.g.,
the direct introduction of advanced technology or purely
economic cost-benefit analysis i s i n most instances useless
and in some instances even disastrous; long-held views that
middlemen are parasites e xp l o i t i n g poor fishermen, or that
peasant fishermen are stubbornly conservative, are too simplis-
tic and do not reflect reality; therefore, prior to the imple-
mentation of projects (or programs), the structure of fisher-
men's communities and their needs should be carefully examined.
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Indeed, an awareness of these lessons is the minimum require-
ment for well-intentioned SSF projects, although these lessons
alone doubtlessly fall far short of delineating a strategy
for SSF development. In other words, there is a growing con-
sensus about some " do n ' t s , II but little is agreed upon about
the "do' s" except for very careful planning.
The vacillating expectations toward fisheries coopera-
tives exemplify such a theoretical black h o l e . Ne e d l e s s to
say, the fisheries cooperative is primarily an economic insti-
tution which enables fishermen to deal collectively with prob-
lems whose magnitude is often far beyond their individual
capacities. 1 Probably no one would disagree that the coopera-
tive is as pivotal an element in SSF development as appropriate
technology, infrastructure, and resource management. In fact,
there are some benefits which fishermen could not obtain with-
out being united; a modern processing plant whose efficiency
is based on economies of scale, bargaining power against mon-
opolistic buyers , market information for which everyone 's
honest reporting is a key, effective resource management, and
political muscle in local politics are all examples of bene-
fits available only to organized fishermen. Not only can an
individual not attain these, but also as is notable in resource
management, the pursuit of these benefits by one individual
may very well damage collective benefits and therefore the
individual 's benefits in the long run. In addition to valid
theory, the fisheries cooperative is further justified by the
13
fact that it is a well-established reality in many developed
countries.
But if fisheries cooperatives are justified, why have
so many attempts to introduce cooperatives into developing
countries ended in fiasco? Meynell writes:
During the 1970s, disenchantment with fish-
eries cooperatives began to set in; they
were difficult to organize, the fishermen
did not want them and they almost invariably
failed. "Fishermen's cooperatives did not
work!" was the conclusion (1984, p. 17).
If there are benefits which are obtainable only through
cooperatives, why have the cooperatives been difficult to or-
ganize? Did fishermen not want benefits?
In the following three sections, we will analyze the
failed attempts at fisheries cooperatives from three different
angles. Concisely stated, the problems of fisheries coopera-
tive development can be conceptually categorized as stemming
from fisheries, from the cooperative, or from development
policy. The problems from fisheries imply that while the
physical, economic, and socio-cultural uniqueness of fisheries
presents some advantages, it more often imposes disadvantageous
conditions in sustaining cooperatives in fishing communities.
The problems from cooperative refer to endogenous problems of
the cooperative, which is a particular business organization
with both merits and flaws. Finally, the problems from devel-
opment policy have come from "i mpr op e r policy frameworks under
which cooperatives have been used. As mentioned earlier, an
intensive investigation of the cooperative experience per se
14
is not the purpose of this study, but there is no question
that such an examination would benefit a discussion on build-
ing cooperative models --the goal of this thesis.
PROBLEMS FROM FISHERIES
Whether they are agricultural, fisheries, or other kinds,
the record of rural cooperatives in developing countries has
been discouraging. It appears, however, that fisheries cooper-
atives belong to the least developed category of cooperatives;
the general impression is that it is more difficult to organ-
ize fisheries cooperatives than agricultural or other rural-
based cooperatives (Meynell, 1984). In addition to the social
and physical constraints generally observable in rural soci-
eties, the characteristics pertaining to fishing activities
seem to impose some extra conditions upon the operation of
fisheries cooperatives, and most such conditions are negative
from a cooperative's point of view--that is, they compound
difficulties more often than alleviate them. The history of
fisheries cooperatives in developed countries invariably indi-
cates that fishermen were latecomers in the national coopera-
tive movement. In Norway, the first attempt to form an agri-
cultural cooperative was made immediately after the Industr ial
Revolution began monetizing the rural economy, but it was
nearly a hundred years later (i.e., in the 1930's) that f ish-
eries cooperatives came into existence (Grimley, 1950). In
the United States, modern agricultural cooperatives mushroomed
15
in the early decades of the twentieth century (Woodworth,
1984) . An old book entitled Cooperatives in New England (by
Ford) reported a remarkable success in cooperative creameries
as early as 1913, as well as a s urging mome n t um throughout
New England for modern cooperatives based on the long coopera-
tive experience of the Granges. Yet the founding of the Point
Judith Fishermen 's Cooperative Association, which is "one of
the most successful [fisheries cooperatives] in the United
States" (Gersuny et al., 1974) was as recent as 1947, notwith-
standing the fact that fishing is as old an occupation as farm-
ing in New England. In Japan, it was only during and after
the Great Depression that fisheries cooperatives began to
undertake economic activities to 'a noteworthy extent, as an
almost desperate response to the impoverishment of their mem-
bers. By contrast, Japanese agricultural cooperatives (or
more precisely, regional cooperatives with predominantly
farmer members in rural areas) had already attained the organ-
izational strength of full-fledged cooperatives by 1929 (Kase ,
1981; Yamamoto, 1980).
Let us turn our attention to fisheries cooperatives in
developing countries, taking an example from Thailand. In
1983 there were 909 agricultural cooperatives with a popula-
tion/member ratio of 19 %, but there were only 20 fisheries
cooperatives with a population /member ratio estimated at 5 to
7% (JICA, 1984; Panayston, 1980). The inferior ity of fisheries
cooperatives to agricultural cooperatives is not conf ined to
16
the quantitative index; some studies note that the range and
quality of services are not comparable either (JICA, 1984;
Miyake, 1984).
These national experiences of both developed and develop-
ing countries support the generalization that the fishing
industry offers a less favorable environment for cooperative
development, but it is not sufficiently clear why this is so.
The following discussion attempts to identify major factors
which could create unfavorable conditions and, in the worst
scenario, terminate cooperatives.
(1) Fisheries as local food producers
Today, more and more fisheries in the Third World are
being enmeshed into global marketing networks, and the domestic
markets also seem to be expanding as communications and trans-
portation improve. However, in many parts of the world SSF
still largely remain local suppliers of fish to the immediate
hinterland markets, rural or urban. The perishability of fish,
low productivity, and the difficulty of planned production
have long deprived this industry of a higher return which the
broader markets could give.
The history of agricultural cooperatives shows that
cash-crop farming oriented primarily toward export markets
accepted cooperatives much more smoothly than did local food-
crop farming. The uniformity of cash-crop produce and the
rather simple distribution channels helped cooperatives to
attain economies of scale from collective marketing and larger
17
processing plants. The successful agricultural cooperatives
in Africa have concentrated on export crops such as coffee and
cotton (Lele, 1981a; Young et al., 1981, p. 28).
The direct intervention of colonialism in transforming
indigenous fishing into an export industry was rare, but iron-
ically, the absence of the colonialist intervention is one of
the reasons why fisheries are difficult to organize into co-
operatives. Nonetheless, the increasing importance of inter-
national commodities like shrimp in Third World fisheries seems
to be altering the picture in favor of cooperatives. An inter-
esting example of successful cooperatives is found in Belize,
where mainly lobster and shrimp are harvested, both for an
export market (Meynell, 1984).
(2) Risks and uncertainties
Besides the physical dangers of working at sea, fisheries
are surrounded by some economic risks and uncertainties. The
difficulties of planned production are often a consequence of
the fact that the biological reproduction of fish resources
is subject to changeable ocean environment and that the activi-
ties of fishermen are considerably restrained by climatic con-
ditions. The open-access nature of fisheries (to be discussed
in depth below) is also perceived as resulting in high risk
because the entry of new vessels into established fisheries,
without any restriction, could ,jeopardize both a prior invest-
ment and a resource (Rothschild, 1983). The remoteness of
fishing operations from land-based control is also considered
18
a serious uncertainty for the land-based management category
into which cooperatives fall (Pollnac, 1982, p. 71). Further-
more, due to rapid exhaustion, frequent loss, and little ver-
satility, fishing boats and gear have a poor mortgage value;
thus providing loans and credit to fishermen is not as safe
as providing them to farmers who have land. Fisheries coopera-
tives have to shoulder the burden of such extra risks and un-
certainties, which are not commonly found in other industrial
sectors.
(3) Common property (open access)
It is well known that fisheries resources are considered
common property from which anyone wishing to do so can obtain
benefits. It is also known that this common property factor
is a culprit which invariably leads to overfishing and, con-
sequently, to the dissipation of economic receipts unless
fishing efforts are artificially restricted. Anderson wrote:
The observed fact that many fishermen eke
out a scanty living may be attributable,
then, to the open-access nature of the
fishery, combined with the fact that ini-
tial high returns may be followed by
hesitant and dilatory adjustments in
population and entry or departure (1977,
p , 54).
In order to counter the crisis of an overcrowded fishing
population pushing up fishing efforts to an excessive level,
some urge the institutionalization of limited entry. In fact,
limited entry based on cooperatives was the historical origin
of the highly developed Japanese fisheries cooperatives. How-
ever, it is well known in Japan that the counterproductive
19
mechanism of common property has sometimes undermined the
proper use of coastal resources inside the cooperative-based
limited entry (Shima et al., 1983). Unlike agriculture, where
farms are us~ally owned individually, the sea is basically no
one's and fish move all around. These facts make the develop-
ment of fisheries cooperatives even more difficult if limited
entry is not a solution compatible with traditional practice
and economic reality in a fishery, or if limited entry cannot
break the strong mechanism of common property.
(4) Mobility
Fisheries are characterized by a high geographical mobil-
ity; fishermen move up and down coasts in search of fish. In
West Africa, fishing tribes move their dwellings seasonally,
like nomads. Fishing communities in Southern Hokkaido were
historically formed by fishermen seasonally migrating from
central Japan to follow schools of herring. Even now, it is
not · uncommon that a fishing boat from Kyushu (an island in
southern Japan) moves up to the coast of Hokkaido, chasing
squid and other migratory species. The geographical mobility
of fishing apparently imposes a very difficult problem upon
the formation and day-to-day operation of fisheries coopera-
tives. The problem is circumvented in Japan by remitting
landing proceeds to a particular cooperative through a nation-
wide network of fisheries cooperatives. However, it is unreal-
istic to expect developing countries to duplicate such a system
in the near future. Another aspect of mobility concerns inter-
20
occupationality. Subsistence fisheries in developing countries
embrace a large number of the rural poor, who engage from time
to time in farming, petty trading, manual labor, and whatever
employment can provide them with a day-to-day livelihood. The
short production cycle of fishing--each operation completed
within a day or two--makes it easier for the rural poor to
gain "a little extra food or cash immediately, or to fill a
gap in another task" (Firth, 1966, p. 2). Such people are
apparently not compatible with a cooperative 's organizational
principle , which is based on a very cohesive membership.
(5) Historical stage of development
Since this subject will be explored in greater detail
in the next chapter, I will present only two points here to
facilitate further discussion.
First, the major technological innovation in fisheries
has been mechanical in nature--for example , the stern trawl,
power-block, and fish-finder. In SSF , too, the mechanization
of fishing boats has been the most significant technological
breakthrough in the last two decades; the widespread use of
outboard engines is nothing but mechanically oriented innova-
tion. On the other hand, in the same period, the greatest
impact of modern science upon peasant agriculture has not been
mechanization. Instead, it was brought about by the technical
package of the Green Revolution, which is biological and chemi-
cal in nature (Hayami et al., 1971, p. 44). In India, agri-
cultural cooperatives developed remarkably among farmers who
21
s uccessfully adopted the Green Revolution technology. The
results of the Green Revolution infer that an inadequate devel-
opment of biological and chemical innovations may adversely
affect the future of cooperatives in SSF.
Second , the research base for SSF development , including
aquaculture, is still in its infancy compared with that of
agriculture in terms of investment, manpower , international
cooperation, and political attention. Research efforts in
both the natural and social sciences and administrative experi-
ence in SSF have lagged behind agricultural counterparts; this
constitutes another disadvantage for fisheries cooperatives.
(6) Socio-cultural uniqueness
Socio-cultural factors are one of the most interesting
as well as difficult to generalize areas in assessing the
uniqueness of fisheries vis-a-vis agriculture.
I
Pollnac (1982,
p. 68) introduces many sociological studies which report the
low social status and even segregation of fishermen in rural
societies. Poggie (1980) suggests that the psychological trait
of independence widely observed among fishermen is a factor
contributing to the lack of success of fisheries cooperatives.
However, there are also some contradictory observations and
literature. As far as Japan is concerned, I doubt that fisher-
men face social prejudice or that fishermen are particularly
independent people. It is interesting to note that a policy
objective intensely supported by Japan's post-war fisheries
administration was tb break down "a nest of rural fascism"
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based on feudalistic community cohesion and to create rational,
independent fishermen (Hisamune, 1984). Furthermore, Grimley
concludes the following about Norwegian fishermen: "The col-
lective mentality would be stronger among the fishermen than
among the farmers who have always been known for their extreme
individualism" (1950, p. 129).
My limited knowledge on socio-cultural factors does not
allow me to pursue the discussion any further, but it may be
safe to conclude that there is a considerable possibility that
the socio-cultural or psychological uniqueness of fishermen,
perhaps negatively, affects the outcome of the cooperative
movement.
We have focused on the negative consequences for coopera-
t ive development of factors unique to fisheries. However,
admittedly, these same factors may stimulate fishermen to make
greater efforts toward cooperatives. For instance, the common
property nature of resources may promote voluntary regulatory
organizations among fishermen. The spontaneous development
of regulatory agreements to control individual gain for the
sake of common interest is not uncommon. Orbach (1978) notes
that a cooperative club was formed among local fishermen in
the Bay of Fundy to allocate fishing rights in a self-policing
manner. A famous custom of Maine lobster fishermen in main-
taining individual fishing territories also exemplifies spon-
taneous cooperation. Such efforts may provide a very strong
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foundation for more formal cooperatives. Moreover, because
fishing does not produce as large a variety of necessities as
traditional peasant farming does, there is little doubt that
the m9re specialized are coastal communities for fishing, the
more strongly they would be bound to the outside market economy
(Firth, 1966; Platteau, 1984). This feature of fisheries may
constitute a favorable condition for modern cooperatives, for
which a strong trade link with the outside world is the neces-
sary prerequisite. However, positive effects stemming from
the peculiarity of fisheries by and large tend to be outnum-
bered by the inherent detrimental factors of fisheries. The
reason for the worldwide phenomenon that fisheries cooperatives
are slow to develop, if they develop at all, in comparison
with other rural cooperatives, lies in these unique charac-
teristics of the fishing industry which are often unwittingly
ignored by development planners.
PROBLEMS FROM COOPERATIVES
Since the days even before the Rochdale pioneers, the
history of the cooperative records an accumulation of self-
sacrificing endeavors by bright-eyed cooperative activists.
Among those dedicating themselves to the cause of self-help
and cooperation were socialist-leaning intellectuals, self-
taught grass-roots leaders, social workers with deep religious
beliefs, and progressive officials. The philosophy of the
cooperative has a universal appeal for its idealism and
populism:
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I believe the following are three important philo-
sophical principles of the cooperat ive: (a) the cooperative
eliminates capitalist exploitation of people by people by
giving only limited rewards to capital and by aiming at pro-
viding services to members rather than gaining profits; (b)
the cooperative promotes grass-roots democracy by allocating
equal opportunities to its participants for decision-making
on cooperative management (typically, the one man, one vote
principle); (c) the cooperative does not in itself adopt v~o­
2lent or revolutionary means to attain goals. However, such
an idealistic posture does not guarantee the cooperative's
viability; the cooperative needs adequate profits, competitive-
ness, and even an aggressive investment plan--everything re-
quired by ordinary corporations.
Unless the cooperative provides clear-cut economic
benefits, or at least prospects for future benefits, it cannot
keep attracting ordinary members who join the cooperative not
because they are advocates of the cause of the cooperative,
but mainly because they see better economic opportunities in
it. In a word, this is what is called the dualism of the co-
operative--it is at the same time a people 's association and
a business enterprise (Dooren, 1982a, p. 31). Problems of co-
operatives actually often stem from this dual ism: if coopera-
tives emphasize efficient management in order to maximize
economic benefits, the difference between them and private
corporations becomes increasingly murky- -like many credit
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unions in developed nations--but if they are run with naive
idealism, they often find themselves losing in real-world
business competition--like British consumers' cooperatives.
My personal communication with young cooperative employees in
Japan indicates they are considerably frustrated by political-
and social-issue-minded management (consumers' coop) and by
the lack of keen management sense (fisheries credit coop fed-
eration). Yet some "cooperativists" warn that the growing
"managementalist" tendency could be a part of the problem
rather than a part of the solution for the future of Japanese
fisheries cooperatives.
In developing countries, the ambiguity ,of the coopera-
tive concept stemming from this dualism makes it very difficult
for uneducated rural people to understand the cooperative.
Cooperative education is always stressed, but cooperative ob-
jectives, mechanism, spirit, and terminology are apt to be too
foreign to the realities of rural lives in these countries.
Studies in peasant societies show it is not uncommon that
peasants regard cooperatives as a channel to receive uncondi-
tional gifts from their paternal governments (Firth, 1966, p.
317; Takigawa et al., 1973). Alternatively, they may perceive
government assistance as a reasonable reward for their attend-
ing what they may think "useless" cooperative seminars and
patiently listening to officers' admonitory speeches. It is
the opinion of the author that the dual role of the coopera-
tive should bear a part of the responsibility for this sort
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of mi sunde r s t a nd i n g .
Though dualism is an interesting issue, I probably
should not indulge in this subject because major problems of
rura l cooperatives in the d e v e l o p i n g world seem to ha v e a dif-
ferent origin and structure. Problems inherent to cooperatives
in SSF are , in a sense, much deeper; they cast a serious ques-
tion o n the feasibility of fis heries cooperatives from t he
very beginning. For a long time economic domination by middle-
men in peasant fishermen societies had been generally believed
to be an impediment to SSF development. Thus it was natural
that t he displacement of exploitative middlemen by egalitarian
cooperatives was eagerly sought. While the necessity of co-
operatives was widely assumed, it was not proved. Now , how-
ever, extensive literature presents co unterevidence against
this assumption (Alexander , 1975; Pollnac, 1981, 1982; Lele,
1981a, 1981b; Platteau, 1984; Blain, 1984). This section
attempts to identify p r o b l e ms for which t he mechanism of the
cooperative itself is responsible.
In order to do so, let us consider the local middlemen 's
role compared with a cooperative's role in marginally produc-
tive SSF. Contrary to a simplistic presumption that modern
organizations are more efficient than indigenous ones, the
cost-efficiency of cooperatives is not always superior to that
of mi dd l eme n . First of all, cooperatives usually need
offices and staff , for paperwork is an inevitable component
of a modern business. In addition, despite the very high
2~
opportunity costs of modern management skills in peasant
societies, cooperatives cannot be run without trained (and
honest) managers. These indispensable inputs to cooperatives
render their operation extremely expensive. Local middlemen,
on the other hand, perform multiple functions with none of
these costs. Apart from buying, processing, transporting, and
selling, they lend money for both production and consumption,
invest capital, bring back news from cities, convey messages
between fishermen, and maybe arrange marriages for fishermen's
children. Some of these functions are of vital importance in
societies where communications media are underdeveloped and
unreliable.
Let us now look at the other side of the coin--i.e.,
income-generating ability. The primary weapon of cooperatives
is, of course, the reduction of intermediary margins, achieved
by drawing fishermen into a single economic unit. If benefits
from this practice more than compensate for the high fixed
costs, cooperatives will, in the long run, be viable from the
management point of view. Unfortunately, the reality is that
the size of individual transactions in SSF is so small that
handling costs tend to eat '.up the profits of the collective
action. Furthermore, unfamiliarity with local conditions and
ideological egalitarianism become another handicap for the
business efficjency of cooperatives. Describing state-
sponsored cooperative loans intended to free Malayan fishermen
from the hands of middlemen, Firth wrote: "This system also
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has met with difficulties, one reason being that the state
was often obliged to take the brunt of the losses made by the
less efficient fishermen" (1966, p. 26). Local middlemen are
undoubtedly more efficient creditors because they can avoid
this sort of risk through their detailed knowledge of the
skill and trustworthiness of individual fishermen with whom
they have an acquaintance of long standing. They further
understand area-specific constraints as well as general char-
acteristics of fishing better than government officials, hired
managers, and foreign advisors (Meynell, 1984). Alexander
(1975) · points out that due to middlemen's swift arrangements
of loans and flexibility in loan repayments, Sri Lankan fish-
ermen regard the credit facilities provided by local middle-
men as superior to those offered by government agencies.
Although strictly speaking cooperatives are not government
agencies, in many countries the same types of inefficiency and
inflexibility plague cooperative management. Lele (1981a) .
suggests that the replacement of a traditional market struc-
ture by a cooperative or a public-sector organization often
only exacerbates inefficiency, particularly if the cooperative
operates in a monopolistic situation.
As for organizational rigidity, we can find two differ-
ent causes. First, government assistance, no matter how well-
intended it may be, has a tendency to make cooperatives bureau -
cratic. Second, the cooperative has an inherent mechanism
toward inflexible management. Cooperative managers are not
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independent businessmen (unlike local middlemen), but are
hired (or appointed) and accountable to member fishermen (or
to the government). Naturally, this makes them security-
seekers who resent irregularity rather than flexible risk-
takers. Fish trading, for instance, is not a steady, secure
business. It is volatile and speculative in nature, reflect-
ing the ceaselessly changing supply and demand in the market.
The security-seekers are the most ill-adapted to this business.
Managers are also reluctant to take discriminatory actions
against members even if it is reasonable to do so from a busi-
ness standpoint.
Clearly, inefficiency, high operational as well as
fixed costs, and ihflexibility are all negative factors
plaguing cooperatives but not local middlemen. Admittedly,
other modern business organizations have the same problems,
and the larger the organizations are, the more serious these
problems will be. However, large organizations have three
advantages that more than compensate for these drawbacks: one
is economies of scale, another is market intelligence (and to
some extent market intervention), and the third is R&D
capability. Unfortunately, many fisheries cooperatives lack
the means to incorporate these advantages. Cooperatives can-
not enjoy economies of scale because of comparatively high
handling costs. They are almost invariably inferior to local
middlemen in gathering information and predicting the market
unless they are able to expand their market area substantially.
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Nor are cooperatives effectively involved in R&D. As long
as fierce competition is maintained among middlemen by small
and scattered production and a strong entry pressure to petty
trading, fisheries cooperatives have limited room to thrive
in SSF.
In summary, the cooperative as a unique organization
with a dual nature--a people's association and a business
enterprise--has greatly contributed to alleviating poverty and
social injustice. However, its two aspects are not always
harmonious. From the economic point of view, it is often slow;
from the social point of view, economic considerations tend
to overwhelm the social ones. Also, the dual nature is not
easy to comprehend. These problems are tough to deal with,
but the major problems of cooperatives in SSF seem to lie
deeper. In general, cooperatives are not only comparatively
costly, inefficient, and inflexible vis-a-vis local middlemen,
but they also lack the means to take advantage of modern econ-
omic organization. Here, a word of caution about our conclu-
sion may be necessary; the above conclusion does not imply
that fisheries cooperatives are always inferior to private
merchants. Many successful fisheries cooperatives in developed
countries indicate the contrary. It should be remembered that
the entire discussion in this section has been based on an
assumption that SSF are marginally productive.
PROBLEMS FROM DEVELOPMENT POLICY
In this section, I wo~ld like to examine problems caused
by t he policy frameworks under which cooperatives have been
used. I have a strong feeling that problems of this category
have been more responsible for the dismal outcome of a number
of past cooperative projects than the previously discussed two
kinds of problems have been. In other words, fisheries cooper-
atives have been misused rather than useless. Discussing
development policy is not an easy job because few systematic
analyses on this issue have as yet been done in the field of
fisheries. This may reflect the fact that community-oriented
SSF development per se has rarely been given a high priority
in the wide spectrum of national development programs. Though
there have been a number of attempts to build fisheries cooper-
atives, particularly in the 1950's and 1960 's, the "golden
age" of the cooperative, they seem to have lacked a genuine
integration with overall fisheries development perspectives.
Bearing in mind that more systematic research efforts are
needed in this field, let us present the general features
found in past cooperative policies, regardless of country-
specific differences.
(1) "The demand of modern society"
Cooperatives were often simply a convenient means for
national governments and development agencies to channel funds
to fishermen when they found it technically impractical to
deal directly with huge numbers of individual fishermen. They
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expected cooperatives to administer part of the loan procedure,
supervise fishermen to use the loans properly, and ensure re-
payment from the fishermen. Borrowing Meynell's (1984) words,
these cooperatives were set up for "the demand of modern
society" rather than for "the needs of the developing communi-
ties." They were designed to be "debt cooperatives" from their
very inception, though not surprisingly most of them could not
satisfactorily function even in the role of debt cooperative
(Takigama et al., 1973). Strictly speaking, this implies that
the primary problem was an absence of elaborated policy frame-
works rather than defects in them. Meynell satirically writes:
. Fi s he r i e s cooperatives .were set up and used
as a channel for funds in order to reach
artisanal fishermen. But during the same
time, fisheries personnel were preoccupied
with understanding the biology of fish and
defining MSYj the fishermen and their organ-
ization were hardly considered at all (1984,
p. 17).
If Meynell's remark sounds too harsh, I would put it in this
way: The governments and agencies took the feasibility and
desirability of cooperatives so much for granted that they did
not doubt the wisdom of instructing fishermen to join govern-
ment-initiated cooperatives as a condition of receiving sub-
sidies and 10ans. 3
(2) The bandaid approach and bureaucratic rivalry
With few exceptions, the context in which fisheries co-
operatives were used was fisheries development, not rural de-
velopment including a fisheries component. Even if the
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policies could be consistent within a fishing industry , atten-
tion was scarcely paid to t he regional economy of which fish-
ing was a part. Such indifference to the regional economy
rendered the cooperative development policy a typical case of
what Gow and Vansant (1983) called a "ba nd a i d approach," mean-
ing that a village would be picked for a development project
wi th little considera tion to regional socio-economic integra-
tion. The bandaid approach in cooperative development signif-
icantly reduced the chances of fisheries cooperatives being
encouraged along with other rural cooperatives in 'the same
region. For example, where the fisheries population was a
little too sparse to be organized efficiently into a coopera-
tive, it tended to be left out of the administrative scope .
However , it might have been possible to incorporate those
fishermen as a subgroup to an agricultural cooperative until
the fis hermen 's experience and consciousness had grown to such
an extent that a n independent fisheries cooperative was in-
tensely desired and viable~ It is well known that agricultural
community development has been frequently paralized by con-
frontations among various government agencies (Holdcroft,
1978). In fisheries , which are usually administered exclu-
sively by fis heries agencies, inter-agency confrontation may
not ha ve been extreme , yet undoubtedly inadequate coordination
between fisheries agencies and other agencies and the narrow
perspective of fisheries agencies were due to the lack of
regional integration in cooperative development.
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(3) Superficial participation
It has been widely agreed that "perhaps the most impor-
tant implication of a rural development strategy based on co-
operativism is that pertaining to the degree of participation
of the rural masses in the control of events directly affect-
ing their lives" (Hope, 1983, p. 27). This is the very reason
why we chose the cooperative as an institutional backbone of
rural development despite the problems we have discussed thus
far. Some researchers have suggested that unless people-
oriented participatory programs are properly incorporated,
production-oriented technical projects alone cannot achieve
their own ends. According to Korten (1980), a Philippines '
irrigation agency learned the importance of helping farmers
form effective associations for operating and maintaining its
irrigation facilities when many completed systems fell rapidly
into disuse due to the lack of cooperation among and with
farmers. Despite the fact that grass-roots democratic parti-
cipation has been admired in political rhetoric, the partici-
pation of peasant fishermen in cooperatives has remained no
more than superficial. In this respect, while some community
development programs in agriculture have attempted to encourage
local initiatives--for instance, matching grants brought by
the village-level worker under the so-called self-help concept
(Holdcroft, 1978), fisheries cooperatives were pegged" for more
direct "top-down " initiatives. The community fisheries center
(CPC) proposed by Ben Yami (1980) is very attractive for its
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technical pragmatism. Nonetheless, I believe the CFC is vul-
nerable to similar criticism with regard to popular participa-
tion; it is unrealistic to think that private enterprises and
parastatals, which are allowed to constitute CFCs, could
enhance the peasant fishermen's socio-political autonomy as
well as economic capabilities without at the same time deepen-
ing the community's dependence upon outside assistance. It
seems to me that though the CFC i s efficient in terms of pro-
viding services to local people, it is still ·unc l e a r to what
extent it could encourage and respond to bottom-up initiative-
building.
(4) Technologist -led development
This aspect of SSF development policy overlaps in part
with the three previously discussed aspects, but it may be
worth examining separately for its clear contrast with agricul-
tural development.
A consensus in recent riterature on fisheries develop-
ment is that in addition to technological and economic per-
spectives, sociological considerations are of vital importance
for SSF development planning. In the history of SSF develop-
ment, the influence of sociologists is unfortunately rather
limited; Meynell (1984) notes the professionals involved in
past fisheries cooperatives have been either fisheries technol-
ogists or management experts on particular aspects of coopera-
tive business. In clear contrast, agricultural community
development policy in the 1950's and 1960's developed under
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the initiative of community development experts with social
science rather than technical backgrounds. Although it is
said that ideological conflicts between these experts and
technical personnel were resolved in favor of the latter as
the shortcomings of community development policy became clear,
their influence has long remained as a counterbalance to tech-
nologist-led development and reappeared later in the main-
stream of development theory, taking such forms as Integrated
Rural Development (IRD) and BHN (5taatz et al., 1984, p. 21;
Holdcroft, 1978). Fisheries development traditionally lacks
such a strong influence of community experts. Needless to
say, this has worked against the well thought-out integration
of cooperatives with overall fisheries development policies.
(5) The blueprint approach
Not only in 55F, but also in many other fields, coopera-
tives have been frequently damaged by being treated as if they
were a ready-made solution to organizational problems. Prior
to project implementation, high-level policymakers would
determine cooperatives' objectives, structure, functions, and
scope of activities based on the stereotyped Rochdale model
or East European socialis~ models (Verhagen, 1984, p. 5). At
times, successful domestic pilot cooperatives, such as the
Comilla project in Bangladesh and Etawah model in India, were
adopted as formal national models (Rutten, 1984). When these
preplanned cooperatives were imposed, the local people re-
sponded sluggishly. Fisheries cooperatives have been initiated
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in the same way. A basic assumption in this approach is that
solutions to the problems are known and that development
projects are nothing but the application of the solutions.
This is what development experts now call the "blueprint ap-
proach," in contrast with the "process approach" (Gow et al.,
1983; Johnston et al., 1982; Korten, 1980). In the process
approach, institutional development is promoted through "a
gradual, evolutional process in which both project staff and
potential beneficiaries are willing to try various alterna-
tives, discard them when they prove unworkable, and try others"
(Gow et al., 1983, p. 432). In other words, one should regard
cooperatives ~hough not exclusively cooperatives) as a movement
or a process rather than a preplannable system. We will take
up this subject again in Chapter III.
In this section, we have examined frameworks of coopera-
tive development policy focusing on (1) the opportunistic
utilization of cooperatives for administrative requirements
of national governments and development agencies, (2) a lack
of regional coordination, which is attributable mainly to
bureaucratic rivalry, (3) the superficial understanding about
the importance of grass-roots participation, (4) defects of
technologist-dominated development planning, and (5) the de-
ficiency of the blueprint approach, in which preplanned co-
operatives are imposed regardless of area-, time-, and people-
specific conditions. The logic behind my early statement
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that problems from development policy were the most responsible
for the failure of fisheries cooperatives is that if we had
formulated development policies more properly, many problems
stemming "from fisheries" or "from cooperatives" could have
been circumvented. From a policymaker's point of view, the
history of the fisheries cooperative in many developed coun-
tries is nothing but a process of overcoming these difficulties
by continuously rectifying the erroneous policies. Of course,
a proper development policy does not rule out the option of
not initiating cooperatives if local conditions are too adverse
to do so. We cannot simply follow try-to-do-everything-for-
everybody policies, since we have limited resources in time,
money, talent, and enthusiasm (Johnston. et ~l., 1982, p. 15).
We have to know what we can do and what we cannot do. Reject-
ing both do-everything optimism and do-nothing pessimism, we
have to concentrate our scarce resources on what we can do.
The reformulation of policy frameworks is a prerequisite for
moving in a new direction in fisheries cooperative development.
CHAPTER II
FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT MODELS
AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS
FOR COOPERATIVES
INTRODUCTION
The discussion in Chapter I suggests that we cannot
afford any more haphazard attempts to organize fisheries co-
operatives. Budgets are tight, moods are bad, and fishermen
are disillusioned. Unless a clear-cut perspective is pre-
sented, the cooperative may become a taboo subject among fish-
eries development professionals. Yet, as discussed earlier,
there are significant benefits which are difficult to obtain
without cooperatives: economies of scale, effective resource
management, market intelligence, social credentials, political
power; thus it is difficult to imagine well-balanced SSF devel-
opment without first considering them. In theory, a government
would be able to substitute the following for cooperatives:
strict fishing regulations, government-owned processing plants,
a market intelligence agency, a campaign to improve the image of
fishermen, an organized political group in a community. In
practice, however, it is absolutely unwise to recommend that
the governments of developing countries having very limited
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administrative capabilities and minimal budgets should carry
out these policies. There seems to be no practical alternative
but to induce fishermen to strive for the above benefits
through their own organizational initiatives.
How can we crystallize such an abstract, lofty norm into
concrete policy guidelines? The purpose of this chapter is
to address this task by specifying strategic options for co-
operative development. These options imply that the integra-
tion of cooperative policy with overall fisheries development
strategy must be the first step in the policy reformulation
process. In other words, this is an attempt to uncover income-
generating factors related directly to production, and to
design cooperative policy with these factors as the foundation.
The validity of such an attempt will be discussed in some
detail later; here a brief background will be given.
The literature increasingly suggests that the active
participation of the rural poor is strongly related to income
enhancement through improved or innovative production (Korten,
1980; Hyden, as quoted by Obern, 1981; Johnston et al., 1982,
p. 173). To be sure, there have been remarkable cases where
people have been successfully mobilized by programs aimed at
meeting social needs--cf., family planning, community centers
(Korten, 1980)--or economic needs that are not linked to pro-
duction--cf., the collective purchase of home necessities,
the saving and credit (Verhagen, 1984, p. 99). However, it is
extremely difficult to incorporate these needs into a
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generalized framework of fisheries cooperative policy since a
need felt most intensely varies greatly from time to time,
from area to area, and from subgroup to subgroup . In addition,
it is questionable whether fisheries cooperatives always can
or should playa leading role to satisfy such needs. The fol-
lowing discussion, therefore, will be confined to the stra-
tegic options based solely on production-related, income-
generating factors.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first
section, we will take a detour and look at the development
experience of world agriculture for the purpose of extracting
useful lessons for fisheries. Drawing on the agricultural
experience, the second section will attempt to identify factors
driving fisheries development and present schematic develop-
ment models, treating capture fisheries and aquaculture sep-
arately. Finally, in the third section, we will reinterpret
these models as strategic options for fisheries cooperatives
and consider the basic roles of cooperatives in the framework
of various strategic options.
In order not to puzzle readers, it may be worthwhile to
make a few comments on the relevance of agriculture to fish-
eries development studies. In spite of the industry taxonomy
that puts fisheries and agriculture into the same category--
that of primary industries- -due to the ir common feature of
exploiting biological energy directly from nature, few com-
parisons have been made between the two industries' development
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from a historical perspective. Agronomists seem to perceive
fisheries as an intriguing but small subsector of agriculture,
for which general theories of agriculture are more or less
applicable. On the other hand, academics and adminis~rators
of fisheries tend to overemphasize the differences between
the two.
However, we have at least three good reasons to do a
comparative study, especially for the benefits of fisheries
studies . . First, fisheries, commercial or subsistence, in most
instances exist side by side with agricultural elements pre-
dominant in rural societies. A traditional linkage of fishing
activities with local agriculture is stronger than it appears
at first glance in terms of capital accumulation, supply of
labor, and market among other considerations. Admittedly,
there are cases where this generalization does not apply; for
instance, the commercialization of fisheries may function to
render this tie increasingly ambiguous, or agriculture itself
may not be substantial in special localities like polar re-
gions and atolls. However, the fact that fisheries are a
segment of the rural society mosaic is still a prevalent
reality in both developed and developing countries. This
viewpoint is particularly important for understanding SSF in
developing countries. Firth recorded that Malayan fishing
communities were, to a considerable degree, enmeshed in the
surrounding agrarian society:
[Fishermen] have their own technical sub -
culture, with which landsmen, particularly
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urban dwellers, are almost totally unfamil-
iar. But this is only in the technological
field; economically, politically, socially,
and religiously they are part of a larger
universe (1966, p. 9).
Although this observation is not always true, what peasant
fishing societies share with neighboring agrarian societies
probably far outweighs what they do not have in common. While
agricultural policies might be able to neglect fisheries,
policies on SSF must always be made in the larger framework
of rural societies as we already discussed in the defects of
the bandaid approach in Chapter I.
The second reason for comparing fisheries with agricul-
ture is that aquaculture, by contrast to capture fisheries,
is rapidly growing. Since aquaculture is "agriculturalized"
fisheries, the socio-economic aspect of fisheries could be-
come even closer to that of agriculture in the future. If we
consider the tremendous prospects of aquaculture, it is un-
thinkable that the general trend of fisheries to "agricultural-
ization" will decline. Tilapia in Israel and Taiwan, channel
catfish in the U.S., shrimp in Ecuador, shellfish and seaweed
in Japan and China are all examples of the recent advances of
aquaculture.
Third, although it is hard for me as a student of fish-
eries to admit this, my honest impression is that fisheries
lag behind agriculture in terms of both development experience
and theory. Since fisheries are not at the level of agricul-
ture in terms of manpower, budget, or social attention, we
have to keep learning from agriculture--unless fisheries
personnel are content to inhabit a forgotten enclave.
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AGRICULTURAL EXPERIENCE
The his~ory of world agriculture embraces so many de-
bates and unknowns that it constitutes an independent academic
discipline in itself. However, for our purposes, Vernon
Ruttan, a leading theorist in international agricultural
development, provides a concise and well-balanced description
of its history in "How the World Feeds Itself" (1980). Ruttan
characterizes agricultural development according to six models.
Three of them, I believe, are of major significance: namely,
the frontier model, the conservation model, and the induced
innovation model (or Green Revolution model). Drawing mainly
on this article, let us examine what these models mean and
how they are related to one another.
(1) The Frontier Model
By scanning the history of production, we find that
prior to the twentieth century, increasing agricultural pro-
duction was almost universally a function of the geographic
expansion of farmland. This is the frontier model, an appar-
ent example of which is the opening up of the new continents.
Villages in Europe, Asia, and Africa used to increase produc-
tion vigorously in the same way, though at a much less dramatic
pace, thereby making a gradual population increase possible.
The intensification of land utilization occurred simultane-
ously, but the main portion of the increment came from the
exploitation of new lands. Despite a general belief that
Chinese agricultural history is an exception to this model,
about half of Chinese production increases from the beginning
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of the Ming dynasty in 1368 to the middle of this century were
also realized by expanding the crop area (Lardy, 1984). As
far as the Third World is concerned, the frontier model re-
mained mainstream as late as the 1960s. The recent famine in
Ethiopia shows this process is still going on to an ecologi-
cally intolerable level in rural Africa.
Generally speaking, the importance of the frontier model
diminished in the Third World between 1960 and 1975, when the
cultivated area increased at an annual rate of 0.7 percent
while yields grew at a rate of 1.6 percent (Loup, 1980, p.
100). Enhanced productivity, achieved through the replacement
of traditional practices with modern techniques, reduced the
importance of the physical enlargement of farming areas. The
change was due to the introduction of high-yield varieties of
rice , wheat, and corn, and associated technical packages. The
subsequent dynamic transformation of traditional farming was
called the Green Revolution, which eventually spread over one
third of the grain-cultivating areas in developing countries
(Jennings, 1974).
(2) The Conservation Model
Economic history reveals that in the period preceding
the Industrial Revolution agriculture in developed countries
underwent a transition which appeared similar to that of the
Green Revolution. Furthermore, there is evidence that in-
creased productivity in the agricultural sector was a precon-
dition for industrialization in Western Europe and Japan (Loup,
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1980, p. 140). The intensification of land use was brought
about by intensive cropping, an integrated crop-livestock
husbandry system, and a consolidat ion of physical facilities
such as drainage and irrigation. This model of development
i s called the conservation model. The conservation model is
qualitatively different from the Green Revolution in that the
refinement of farming techniques was achieved by the farmers
themselves through a slow process of trial and error without
much assistance from institutional innovations based on modern
science. Reflecting such piecemeal and local accumulation of
refinements, the conservation model is a self-contained system;
consequently, the growth rates based on it were quite low in
today's terms. In England and France agriculture achieved
less than one percent annual growth--in contrast to the
dramatic image that the term "Agricultural Revolution" sug-
gests. In China, before the current capitalistic reforms, a
development strategy adopted for agriculture was identical to
the conservation model, and the ecologists' organic farming
movement may be a new version of this model.
It has been widely recognized that neither the frontier
nor the conservation model can be accepted any longer as a
guiding doctrine for international agriculture. The physical
limits to the availability of arable land, given the present
technical level, are a constraint for the former model, and
expected growth using the latter model would be disappointingly
slow. Neither model would be able to match food production
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with annual population growth, which is predicted to be more
than 2 percent until the year 2000 in most developing countries
(World Bank, 1983).
(3) The Induced Innovation Model
History shows that agriculture in developed countries
gradually entered a new development stage based on the induced
innovation model. Since the beginning of this century agricul-
tural productivity has been markedly enhanced by the applica-
tion of new scientific and technological innovations developed
in research institutions and universities. High-yield strains,
pesticides, chemical fertilizers, agri-machines, and ·scien-
tific farm management are all the brain-children of institu-
tionalized R & D--obviously not the refinements of artisanal
farming techniques.
The Green Revolution was a process similar to the in-
duced innovation model which took place several decades later
in the developing world; in other words, the Green Revolution
was a new version of the induced innovation model developed
around laboratory-produced grain varieties called miracle rice
and miracle wheat. Although the Green Revolution has now lost
its impetus as areas readily suitable to adopt its technology
have dwindled away, its consequences in Latin America and
tropical Asia have been no less than spectacular; for instance,
India, a country suffering from uncontrolled population growth,
managed to attain self-sufficiency in grain production largely
due to the Green Revolution (Elfring, 1983).
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The dark side of the Green Revolution is also noted by
many researchers, and it is one of the most intensely debated
issues in agricultural development studies. In some cases,
different groups of researchers reach very opposite conclusions
after investigating the consequences of the Green Revolution
in the same area, probably reflecting their different paradigms
of "development" (e.g., Umehara, 1982 versus Hayami et al.,
1983). However, despite some drawbacks, the Green Revolution
has been successful in proving that a transition from a
resource-based system of agriculture in developing countries
to a science-based one is very possible. One lesson from the
Green Revolution is clear: rural development programs must
always contain at their core a strong production drive (or
income-generating factors) in order to fight back the continu-
ing marginalization of small rural producers. No matter how
elegantly planned, development efforts lacking the income-
generating factors may end up as just another international
welfare program.
(4) The Biorevolution Model
Let us turn our attention to the future. What we can
see in the immediate future is a new wave of the technical
revolution. In addition to further advances in the traditional
agricultural sciences, a new set of scientific breakthroughs
is opening up an era of "biorevolution." Among the promising
fields are genetic engineering and microbiology. The Green
Revolution was based on R&D in traditional biology and
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chemistry: e.g., cross-breeding and selective breeding. Not
only were these processes time-consuming, but also the diffi-
culties in exchanging genetic traits between different species
were immense. Now, thanks to the developments of cellular and
molecular engineering, scientists are rapidly improving tech-
niques to execute plant crosses between genetically very
different varieties and seriously talking about a hybrid of
potatoes and beans and other unimaginable crop combinations
(Kenney et al., 1984; O'Type et al., 1984). The development
of biotechnology will in all likelihood have an unprecedented
impact upon agriculture in developing countries, not to men-
tion that of developed countries. Kenney and Buttel give an
example:
Genetic engineering may well be able to pro-
duce varieties of rice with greater saline-
tolerance or wheats tolerant to aluminum.
The importance of these research topics is
clear; for example, 60 million hectares of
land in Southeast Asia are affected by
high salinity. Much of Brazil's land is
affected by severe aluminum toxicity prob-
lems (1985, p. 67).
Another possibility, though in the more distant future, is
crops capable of fixing atmospheric nitrogen through symbiotic
bacteria. (Thereby much less fertilizer is needed; Hardy
et al., 1984). Moveover, biotechnology is expanding its appli-
cation to animal husbandry, plant tissue culture, and other
fields such as medical science. The potential impact of bio-
technology is so large--in making agriculture more efficient
and even in industrially displacing a part of agricultural
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production--that some assert that the biorevolution is the
only hope for increasing agricultural production in tandem
with the ever-swelling world population (Elfring, 1983).
Kenney and Buttel (1985) also suggest that agriculture in
developing countries does not have the choice of ignoring
biotechnology if it is to survive the fierce compet ition from
developed countries ' agriculture reinforced with biotechnol-
ogy. Table 1 summarizes the main difference between the
Green Revolution and biorevolution.
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Table 1. The main difference between the Green Revolution
and biorevolution.
Characteristics
Crops affected
Other products
affected
Areas affected
Research skills
required
Crops displaced
Green Revolution
Wheat, Rice, Maize
None
Some LDCs; some
locations (i.e. if
accompanied by irri-
gation, high quality
land, transport
availability, etc.)
Conventional plant
breeding and paral-
lel agricultural
sciences
None (except the
germplasm resources
represented in tra-
ditional varieties
and land races)
Biorevolution
Potentially all
crops, including
vegetables, fruits,
agroexport crops
(e.g. oil palms, co-
coa), and specialty
crops (e.g. spices,
scents)
Animal products,
Pharmaceuticals,
Processed food prod-
ucts, Energy
All areas; all na-
tions, all locations,
including marginal
lands (characterized
by drought, salinity,
Al toxicity, etc.)
Molecular and cell
biology expertise
plus conventional
plant breeding skills
Potentially any
Source: Kenny et ale (1985) p. 70.
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FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT MODELS
Now let us turn in this section to fisheries, our pri-
mary area of interest, to see if the models outlined above
can be useful in conceptualizing the historical development
of fisheries as well and if so, how.
(1) The Frontier Model in Capture Fisheries
Fishing activities had been confined for a long time to
lakes, rivers, and narrow bands of coastal waters before pro-
gress in shipbuilding and propulsion mechanics made possible
the geographic extension of fishing operations. With few
exceptions--such as Nordic fishermen who voyaged as far as
Newfoundland before Columbus--it was only after the nineteenth
century that distant-water fisheries developed on a global
scale through motorization. However, once it gained momentum,
the drive to explore farther fishing grounds became irresist-
ible and exponential. This was the inception of the modern
fishing industry. The British spearheaded this move.
Cunningham et al. describe it:
Before 1840 fishing was mainly coastal. In
1891, trawling off Iceland by British vessels
commenced. By 1905 trawlers had begun
visiting the Barents Sea, and by 1914 fishing
grounds extended from Bear Island, Spitz-
bergen and the White Sea in the north to the
Moroccan coast in the south. The period
between the World Wars witnessed a continua-
tion of the process . In retrospect
it would appear that Hull made the "correct"
decision, to judge by the fact that the
profitability of distant-water fishing was
nearly three times that of near and middle-
water fishing (1985, p. 130).
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In the Far East, the Japanese were undertaking the same
process. When the Russian threat was eliminated as a conse-
quence of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese vigorously
began distant-water fishing in the untapped North Pacific re-
source. Since then the promotion of distant-water fisheries
has become one of Japan's top national policy priorities.
Further along in history, its fishing industry again showed
remarkable growth after the ruin of World War II as a result
of using the same strategy. Soon the Soviet Union and other
East European nations joined the race and quickly became
important fishing nations. Following these forerunners, some
developing countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and to
a lesser extent Cuba and Ghana pursued more or less the same
policy to develop their fisheries. This process continued
until fishing fleets from these countries completely covered
the world's oceans; here evidently the key to increasing pro-
duction has been the spatial expansion of fishing grounds.
In this context, no matter how mechanically sophisticated
fishing hardware was, the basic structure of world fisheries
remained similar to the frontier model of agriculture. Large
trawlers, whale factory ships, and airplane-accommodated purse
seiners were all symbols of prosperity in the heyday of the
frontier model.
However, in the early 1970's the frontier model came to
an unexpectedly early end; the biological limitation of re-
sources and the geographical dead end became increasingly
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clear. A sense of crisis and much dissatisfaction with the
regime for world fisheries led coastal countries to extend
their seaward jurisdictions even before a consensus was
reached in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). Once the suspicion that the frontier model did not have
a future became a reality, this model was quickly d iscarded
as a fisheries development strategy--at least in theory. It
i s noteworthy, however, that some developing countries
hastened to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of
foreign fishing from their EEZs; this may be viewed as a rem-
nant of the frontier model, particularly when optimistic ex-
pectations are associated with it. Nevertheless, it is
unquestionable that the frontier model is no longer the lead-
ing development doctrine in either theory or practice.
(2) The Conservation Model i n Capture Fisheries
What did we have after the frontier model disappeared
from the stage? A world-wide chorus of Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY) theory, of course; the conservation model emerged
as a new faith. Instead of an expansion of fishing grounds,
the conservation model urges that fishing efforts be optimized,
economic losses minimized, and thereby production in a given
area maximized. It was no longer a mere pedantry to talk
about the tragedy of commons and dissipated rent; note how
significantly the philosophy of the conservation model af-
fected the process of shaping fisheries provisions i n UNCLOS
III. However, the realization of MSY (or MEY) through proper
56
fisheries management is very difficult, if not impossible, in
practice. Inadequate scientific knowledge, limited research
capability, inflexible administration, a lack of enforcement,
and the indifference and even hostility of fishermen are ob-
stacles which are individually troublesome enough to shatter
fisheries management completely. In fact, many important
fisheries, ranging from North Sea herring and Alaskan king
crab to trawl fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand, collapsed at
the very same time that MSY was prevalent among academics and
administrators. The underlying problem is probably twofold:
(a) The common property nature of fishery resources makes the
conservation model extremely complex. In the agricultural
conservat ion model an independent farmer solely and tangibly
controls his production. By contrast, even state-of-the-art
fishery research techniques cannot easily tell what is happen-
ing under water, and what is worse, any conservation efforts
are constantly threatened by the so-called free riders. In
this respect, many studies report a serious deterioration of
public resources in the rural society of developing countries.
Not only fisheries but also public land, where people used to
graze cattle and obtain fuel wood and construction material,
are now under too heavy a population pressure to allow a half-
hearted conservation effort to be viable (Verhagen, 1984, p.
13; Barker, 1984). (b) Too short a time has elapsed for all
the turmoil to have settled. In some places, the conservation
model has been a time-honored practice. Without a sophisti -
57
cated theory, Japanese coastal fisheries have been managed
fairly well with the conservation model under the village-
based (later cooperative-based) limited entry regime. Of
course it was not done overnight; a long history transmuted
the conservation idea to consensus and the consensus to common
sense. To the conservation model, time is a vital function.
If we could work out an effective measure to circumvent
the common property nature of fisheries, it would not be un-
reasonable--albeit a seemingly discouraging picture of world
fisheries management--to expect that the conservation model
would yield a moderate gain over a long period of time through
a "learning effect" of the people concerned.
(3) The Induced Innovation Model in Capture Fisheries
In some developed countr ies, institutional R&D is ex-
ploring new sources of development for fisheries and has
actually started changing a commonly held image of fisheries.
An area most frequently referred to is development of the
cost-saving technology; instead of increasing production, this
technology is aimed at shrinking the costs without reducing
the catch. Particularly after the second oil crisis in 1978,
research efforts were focused toward the development of fuel-
efficient engines, light and durable hulls, less water-
resistant nets, and even revived sails. Parallel to such
mechanical innovations, biological innovations began affecting
coastal fisheries in developed countries. The best example is
probably Japanese culture -based fisheries, in which
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artificially propagated fish seedlings are released into and
grow in nature, and fishermen catch them in addition to the
natural stock. At present for this purpose, Japan has fifty
propagation centers which mass-produce seedlings like a
factory, and their network covers a substantial portion of
Japan 's cqastal area (Norin Tookei Kyokai, 1984). Developing
countries too have urgent problems which need technologically
innovative solutions. For instance, the trash fish by-catch
taken along with a target species (particularly shrimp) and
simply discarded at sea is estimated to amount to at least
several million tons a year--in the midst of a protein short-
age in the Third World (Ceres, No.1, 1984). The development
of a cheap preservation method on board could lead to total
utilization of the by-catch for human consumption.
An intriguing feature of the induced innovation model
for capture fisheries is that many innovations--either mechan-
ical, biological, or chemical--can make little or no impact
upon the long-term productivity of fisheries unless they are
used in proper combination with the conservation model. In
this sense, it is erroneous to regard the induced innovation
model as a cure-all substitute for the poorly managed conser-
vation model. Nevertheless, many successful cases of Japanese
culture-based fisheries indicate that provided adequate con-
servation measures, the induced innovation model has a huge
potential which the conventional conservation model will never
be able to match.
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(4) The Frontier Model in Aquaculture
Aquaculture has also gained much attention as a substi -
tute for the frontier model of capture fisheries. However,
it is not difficult to give examples of aquaculture develop-
ment which in themselves are based on the frontier model. In
Latin America, the future development of shrimp culture is in
part dependent upon the available space of mangrove swamps;
the expectation that Mexico will become the largest shrimp
producer surpassing Ecuador is attributed to its .hu ge unex-
ploited swamp areas. Cunningham et al. (1984, p. 348) note
that in Asia there are 130 million ha of swamp, tidal waters,
lakes, and lagoons which might be suitable for aquaculture,
while less than 3 million ha are currently being used. Al-
though it is no more than fancy to assess the world aquacul-
ture potential by simply mul~iplying unused areas by the
present yield per unit, i t is equally unlikely that aquacul-
ture development will face spatial limitations in the near
future.
(5) The Conservation Model In Aquaculture
An interesting feature that has commonly appeared in
much aquaculture literature is an admiration of traditional
Chinese pond culture, the underlying philosophy of which is
exactly the same as the conservation model in agriculture.
The Chinese developed carp culture into a complete energy-
recycling system which allowed as many as six varieties of
carp to occupy different ecological niches so that an entire
water column was utilized.
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In recent years, the introduction
of a couple of species of tilapia has further increased the
efficiency of the system (Zweig, 1984). Fish farming in China
is also an integrated part of ann agriculture-livestock hus-
bandry complex; a well-known example is an organic combination
between sericulture and aquaculture. Mulberry plants are
grown on pond dikes, and mud from the pond bottom is used as
fertilizer. Silkworms grow by feed ing on leaves of the plant
while their feces and pupae are returned to the pond as fer-
tilizer and feed respectively (Zweig, 1984). Fish farmers in
developing countries are advised to follow the Chinese system
to intensify their production. Bardach et al. write:
While Chinese carp culture in the People's
Republic will continue to be vital to the
peoples of Asia, the greatest contribution
of the Chinese fish culturists may be not
to their own people, but to the world, as the
contingencies of population excess and pro-
tein shortage force us all to apply the prin-
ciples of ecology as they did centuries ago
(1972, p. 119).
Aga in, the conservation model seems to be the guiding theory
for world aquaculture. But we must not forget that the re-
markable efficiency of Chinese fish culture has been accom-
plished through farmers' tr ial and error over thousands of
years. Their techniques are often locality-specific and
should be called "experience- intens ive," to dist inguish them
from "knowledge-intensive," science-based fish farming. Thus
the problems transferring the Chinese farming t e chnology to
other areas of the world are numerous (Zweig, 1984).
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(6) The Induced Innovation Model in Aquaculture
Japan provides the best example of the induced innova-
tion model in aquaculture, which has had a revolutionary ef-
fect on its coastal fisheries during the past two decades.
The steady accumulation of scientific knowledge about biology
and oceanography has made possible the successive development
of new aquaculture techniques, in particular in mariculture.
Today mariculture has grown to account for more than one third
of Japan's coastal fishery production (Norin Tokei Kyokai,
1984). Aquaculture has not only raised production in itself,
but it has also helped break the vicious circle of low produc-
tivity stemming from over-population in capture fisheries.
The author personally witnessed a dynamic change triggered by
new techniques in scallop and kelp farming in a small town in
Southern Hokkaido. Ex-capture fishermen, the poorest group
in the town, began enjoying at least an average living stand-
ard soon after these techniques were introduced. Tilapia
culture in Israel and Taiwan is another successful case in
which institutionalized research efforts paid off. Tilapia
farming is now firmly established as a commercial business in
both countries, and amazing innovations continue (Pullin,
1984). A recent issue of Ceres reports that cross-breeding
between Nile tilapia and albino Java tilapia has produced
"extremely fast growing red varieties," and the commercial
application of this technique has increased tilapia productiv-
ity "a hundred fold at once" (1984, No.4, p. 7).
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Probably no more examples are necessary to illustrate
the magnitude of the on-going innovations in aquaculture. We
have noted that the Green Revolution was nothing but a rapid
transition from resource-based to science-based agriculture;
by extension, the current development of science-based aqua-
culture must be named "the Blue Revolution." We see no reason
to deny the strong likelihood that the induced innovation
model will also have a substantial impact on aquadulture in
developing countries in the near future. Milkfish culture in
Southeast Asia and shrimp culture in Latin America already
suffer from an absolute shortage of naturally spawned seeds,
and the only solution will be to produce the seeds artif i -
cially in hatcheries (Weidner, 1985). International technical
cooperation, as well as the establishment of national research
capabilities, will be needed to address the problem. Since
aquaculture generally has a much shorter history than agricul-
ture does, there still remains much room for contributions
from the frontier model and the conservation model, but the
center of gravity is shifting from those models to the induced
innovation model. The following demonstrates the potential
this model can tap for aquaculture in developing countries.
One of the controversial points in aquacultural development
is whether it should or would orient to luxurious interna-
tional commodities like shr imp, or whether local nutritional
improvement should be given top prior ity. A recent study
suggests that the polyculture of a k ind of freshwater prawn
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and a monosex tilapia hybrid i s possible without reducing the
stocking rate of tilapia, thus calling into question the pre-
sumption that the two object ives are mutually exclusive
(Pullin, 1984).
(7) The Biorevolution Model in Aquaculture
The growth of the biorevolution model in agriculture
will undoubtedly spillover into aquaculture because the tech-
niques of biotechnology, such as recombinant DNA, are quite
universal and ' v e r s a t i l e . Researchers are already able to
create a rat-sized mouse by transferring a growth hormone
gene from rats into mice (Kenney et al., 1984), so it may no
longer be a wild fancy to imagine a "fresh-water lobster" or
a "tropical salmon."
Biotechnology could not only accelerate improvements
in productivity, but also remove various difficulties in
domesticating wild species and in cultivating fish in a
foreign environment. One of the immediate utili~ies of bio-
technology is the development of a s ingle cell protein from
natural gas or human wastes that can be used as an artificial
feed (Kenney et al., 1984). If single cell protein becomes
available, it will reduce feed costs substantially and thus
provide a new opportunity for farming many species which are
presently uneconomical. Although to predict the future is
bound to be risky, it may be safe to assert that aquaculture
will gain a renewed impetus from this new breed of science.
As for aquaculture in developing countries, what we must
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address at the beginning of the biorevolution era is the need
for long-term basic research because present tropical aqua-
culture research is generally too short-term and adaptive to
advance in tandem with aquaculture R&D (Pullin et al., 1984).
To summarize, while in capture fisheries the frontier
model has essentially been replaced by the conservation model
in theory, we probably have a long way to go before we can
create a social environment that allows the conservation model
to work effectively. Even if this process is relatively
smooth, it is unlikely that the conservation model alone will
enable world fish production to keep up with population in-
creases (Cunningham et al., 1985, p. 310). Fisheries statis-
tics of the FAO have already begun to indicate the slow-growth
nature inherent in the conservation model; after the explosive
growth based on the frontier model in the 1950s and 1960s,
world fish production increased by only 9 percent from 1970
through 1982--that is, less than 1 percent per annum. Th~ fact
coincides with the historical trend we discussed in the con-
servation model of agriculture. Aquaculture, on the other
hand, has a much higher potential, for it can surpass , the
ceiling of natural productivity by means of modern science
and technology. The on-going Blue Revolution will accelerate
on a global scale as a strong research base is established
nationally and internationally. Furthermore, the spillover
from the agricultural biorevolut ion will provide a lot of new
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opportunities for the future of aquaculture.
I expect that a combination of the existing three models
plus the possibilities of the biorevolution model will gener-
ate tremendous energy for aquaculture development in coming
years. I am not implying that capture fisheries are no longer
important; clearly capture fisheries will continue to account
for the predominant portion of world fish production. There-
fore, it is hoped that not only will the induced innovation
model be introduced into aquaculture to the maximum extent,
but also that improved fisheries research and proper conser-
vation efforts will help capture fisheries evolve to the stage
of the induced innovation model.
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STRATEGIC OPTIONS
In the foregoing two sections we have shown that the
development models theorized in agriculture offer an adequate,
if not perfect, analytic framework within which to consider
fisheries development. We have also shown that eight differ-
ent models can be identified, although for practical purposes
there are seven models--i.e., the biorevolution model for
capture fisheries can be excluded . Table 2 summarizes the
models and factors driving development in these models.
Table 2. Factors driving development i n fisheries development
models .
-
Capture
Fisheries Aquaculture
Frontier Geographical expan- Geographical expan-
Model sion of fishing sion of fish farm-
grounds ing
Conservation Attainment of MSY Polyculture and
Model (or MEY) through integration with
proper resource agriculture and
management other production
activities
Induced Development of c o s t- Inst itutionalized
Innovation saving technology R&D to develop
science-based
Culture-based techn ical package
fisheries
Ut ilization of trash
fish by-catch
Biorevolution Release of genetic- New feed, new med-
Model ally engineered icine, new genetic-
fish into natural ally improved
environment( ?) species
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The purpose of this section is to examine how cooperative
development can be reformulated in terms of the seven fisher-
ies development models. An important--probably the most im-
portant--point for fisheries cooperative policy is (as discus-
sed earlier) that it must be consistent with the overall
strategy of fisheries development. It appears that in the
past many developing countries made ill-fated attempts to
implant stereotyped cooperatives which were suitable neither
to the social environment nor to development objectives. By
reinterpreting these seven models as the "strategic option"
for fisheries cooperatives; by paying due regard to the various
functions that differen~ types of cooperatives can perform,
we will be able to outline a course for cooperatives which
will be fit for the broader framework of fisheries development.
This section will also discuss potential pitfalls in the course
of cooperative development based on each of the strategic op-
tions.
Before moving on into cooperative design, some premises
for discussion should be noted here. (a) It is more realistic
to suppose that a government simultaneously takes two or three
strategic options; thus interactions between options necessi-
tates further consideration. However, for the sake of simpli-
city, the following discussion largely assumes that a govern-
ment chooses a single option for a given area. (b) Because
it is impossible to presuppose all possible conditions to which
actual cooperatives have to adapt, it must be understood that
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the proposed cooperat ives are broadly indicative and obviously
need case-by-case adjustments. (Chapter III will, in part,
answer this problem.) ( c ) It is not our intention in the
following sections to discuss whether a certain strategic op-
tion in itself is appropriate for today's developing countries.
This question goes beyond the scope of this study. Instead,
we will discuss how and what kinds of cooperatives should be
proposed based on a given strategic option. (d) Although the
seven strategic options are supposed to provide a conceptual-
ized framework of national fisheries development policy regard-
less of the development stages of nations, discuss ion will
mainly focus on developing countries given the purpose of this
paper.
1. Strategic Option 1:
the frontier model.
Develop capture fisheries based on
Most of the fisheries policies adopted by developing
countries in the past fall into this category. Where the fish-
ing industry was virtually non-existent or too primitive to
exploit resources fully, development was nothing but the in-
troduction of new technologi~s, particularly those for LSFi as
long as unused resources existed, this policy could achieve
remarkable production increases in some countries. 4 But today,
geographical, biological, and legal limit~tions are so appar-
ent that it is often questionable whether to recommend that
developing countries plan quick LSF development. Even if
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offshore resources clearly indicate that a modern fisheries
sector should be expanded, a government must not make overly
ambitious plans. On the contrary, it should take rather cau-
tious steps; for instance, each year only a very limited
number of licenses should be given to new vessels. Coopera-
tives should first be organized among emerging boat-owner
groups. We can distinguish two areas to which such coopera-
tives would be able to contribute.
First, the cooperatives could function as autonomous
regulatory organizations to maintain optimum fishing efforts.
In order to make them viable, the government would probably
have to force license recipients to join the cooperatives, and
if a boat were repeatedly uncollaborative, the government would
have to take strong measures, including revoking the license.
Once the cooperatives began acquiring some degree of maturity,
the government would have to consult them about matters related
to the further issue of licenses. The merits of this sort of
cooperative are that (a) licensed fishermen as a group become
a strong block against excessive entries of new boats into a
fishery, and (b) social pressure from members of the coopera-
tive helps prevent an individual boat from violating regula-
tions. Unless such a bottom-up power effectively counters
the pressures of new entry and illegal fishing, any government
regulations will likely remain nominal, no matter how beauti-
fully they are written.
As the reader may have noticed, this regulatory function
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of cooperatives is little different from that of cooperatives
based on the conservation model . This stems from the fact
that there are no fisheries left for which we can afford to
neglect resource management, even though they are in relatively
early stages of development. In this respect, it is not ex-
treme to say that a pure frontier model is not an option for
today's fisheries development.
The second area concerns resolving bottlenecks to the
steady development of a modern fleet. As the number of boats
and production increase, some constraints often appear in
either production inputs or outputs because it is not always
possible for every economic component surrounding fisheries to
change at the same pace. For instance, traditional middlemen
may not be able to expand the market consistently with swell-
ing production; the lack of a modern insurance system may be-
come a bottleneck to modern fleet expansion; the unstable
supply of fuel .and spare parts may hamper fishing activities.
If the need to resolve such constraints is intensely felt by
the member boats, the coperatives will have the chance to
undertake an economic service. Here, two points have to be
made clear. (a) To feel needs strongly is one thing, but to
prefer to fulfill the needs through cooperation is another.
One prerequisite to combining the needs with cooperative solu-
tions is the group-consciousness created through members' ex-
perience in the cooperatives as both self-regulatory bodies
and interest groups. (b) If the increase of fishing boats is
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relatively slow, an indigenous economic structure may have
enough time to adjust itself to new opportunities. Thus it is
important to understand that it is not always necessary to
replace existing private businesses by cooperatives . In this
case, it is better for cooperative activity to be confined to
the role of coordination--e.g., the operation of auctions
rather than direct marketing activity.
Potential Pitfalls
As elaborated in Chapter I, it is now clear that the
development of LSF does not necessarily dissolve the problems
of SSF. Similarly, it is doubtful whether the successful de-
velopment of cooperatives among LSF boats will have a diffusion
effect over an SSF sector. Although it is legitimate to con-
centrate administrative efforts to help organize cooperatives
in LSF when LSF are about to grow or are growing, we must be
aware that they probably have little impact on the organization
of peasant fishermen. On the contrary, there is a real risk
that the political maneuverabil ity which cooperatives of LSF
boats come to obtain will be used to restrict the fishing of
peasant fishermen.
2. Strategic Option 2: Develop aquaculture based on the
frontier model
In this strategic option, proposed cooperatives will be
similar to agricultural settlement cooperatives because aqua-
culture development takes place in areas like mangrove swamps
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where little or no substantial economic activity preexists.
For settlement projects, the initial production credits and
living funds must be provided by the government until new
settlers are able to harvest sufficient fish to support them-
selves. I am inclined to think that the· government should
directly implement the financial assistance without using co-
operatives because cooperatives set up for this purpose tend
to give settlers a wrong impression of what the cooperatives
are all about. Alternatively, I believe cooperatives must be
encouraged to engage in collective bargaining with merchants
on the supply of production inputs and the sale of fish. This
is one of the most viable plans if new settlers are strangers
to each other and therefore have difficulties organizing cohe-
sive cooperatives immediately, and if competition among local
merchants is sluggish. A cooperative for collective bargain-
ing does not require a neat office and a professional manager,
though it needs leadership for coordination and perhaps periodic
assistance by government officials. Furthermore, the develop-
ment of collective bargaining power implies that settlers would
be better prepared to make their voices effectively heard in
public agencies by increasing their "claim-making power"
(Verhagen, 1984, p. 25). More advanced models of a cooperative
should be proposed, based on an accumulated experience of co-
operation, when aquaculture systems shift to the conservation
or induced innovation models.
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Potential Pitfalls
A crisis in this type of cooperative is predictable: if
the settlement projects thrive, more middlemen will be attrac -
ted to dealing with settlers and some settlers may wish to
drop out of collective bargaining. In particular very success-
ful settlers who can get better prices and, at the other extreme,
depressed settlers who need money for their next meal may be
tempted to thwart sales agreements. It is difficult to judge
whether the settlers, including those who are dissatisfied with
a particular sales agreement, will resolve this problem by
strengthening their solidarity or by simply splitting away.
The cooperatives will be able to survive to the extent that
the settlers are conscious of the merits of cooperation. Even
if collective bargaining is terminated, the cooperative would
have a much greater opportunity of resurfacing when the
settlers faced other common problems in the future.
3. Strategic Option 3: Develop capture fisheries based on
the conservation model.
The purpose of cooperatives designed under this option
is almost identical to that of cooperatives in Option I--that
is, autonomous fisheries management through socio-political
clout to counter the increasing pressures of new entry and
mutual supervision to enforce regulations. However, because
this option is usually applied to fisheries which are already
over-fished and have no geographical escape--a situation
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manifested in many SSF~-there are some aspects we have to con-
sider differently from Option 1. First, while one role of
cooperatives under Option 1 is to limit new entries, here
cooperatives must help reduce the existing fishing efforts to
an optimal level; obviously this job is much more difficult.
Second when this option is applied to SSF it cannot expect
much administrative help. Even if it is possible for a handful
of fisheries agency officials of a developing country to super-
vise say 50 trawlers congregated in one or two ports, they are
nearly powerless when faced with a multitude of small boats
spreading along entire coasts.
Given the considerations noted above, cooperative devel-
opment policy must induce fishermen to establish a higher level
of control over their resources. Bailey (1981) suggests that
peasant fishermen be helped to form community-based resource
management organizations in order to enable them to cope with
a threat posed by commercial trawlers. Although he seems to
overlook" another threat from within SSF, I basically support
his proposal. In my opinion, the most effective policy would
be to organize fishermen into community-based cooperatives and
grant the cooperatives the exclusive right to determine the
mode of utilizing their resources. In order to prevent an
uncontrolled increase in the fishing population, these coopera-
tives must be allowed to limit their membership with the
approval of the authorities. In the long run, a cooperative-
based sea tenure system, as successfully implemented in Japan
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and Korea, can be considered as a means of strengthening the
cooperatives if the exist ing customs are not too hostile to
such a system.
As for the economic activities of cooperatives, policy-
makers must be patient enough for the bottom-up initiative to
grow through fishermen's experience in collective resource
management, and they must c o n c e n t r a t e assistance toward co-
operatives which have had a serious commitment to economic
activities. In Japan, fishermen 's organizations took about
25 years to start limited economic activities, and another 20
years were needed before they were authorized to fully engage
in economic businesses (Yamamoto, 1980). A dogmatic idea that
collective marketing or financial service is always the pri-
mary field of ' c o op e r a t i v e activities must be discarded in the
peasant cooperative; although an option for economic activities
should be kept open, administrative efforts in SSF must be
focused on the consolidation of socio-political autonomy for
peasant fishermen, notably over coastal resources.
Pitfalls
Unfortunately cooperation-building under this option is
very difficult for the following reasons:
1. Unless fishermen 's communitie's have a relatively egalitar -
i a n structure and the "share of poverty" is a commonly
accepted norm, the rural e l i t e may dominate cooperatives
and distort the patterns of access to resources in their
own favor (Obern et al., 1981). In a way similar to the
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enclosure act, this would threaten weak segments of com-
munities such as minorities, immigrant fishermen, and
part-time fishermen.
2. If cooperatives with limited membership and sea tenure are
incompatible with existing customs, this model may cause
fierce intra- and inter-community conflicts.
3. The conservation model is often incapable of achieving an
immediate production increase; subsequently the chance of
upgrading these cooperatives to include economic activities
is rather slim, at least for the time being.
4. This model of cooperatives is intended to reduce fishing
efforts, but mounting population pressures in peasant
societies may nullify such cooperatives in the long run.
We must bear in mind that the successful development of
the conservation model in Japan was achieved under specific
conditions--i~e., rapid economic growth had successively
drained an excess of the fishery population out of the
villages. Strictly speaking, this is a problem of the
conservation model itself rather than that of the coopera-
tive based on the conservation model. The solution can be
found only in the creation of jobs in some other ways
(Penayotou, 1980), either inside or outside the fish~ng
industry. If we must find new employment opportunities
inside fisheries, other strategic options must always be
combined with the conservation model.
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Develop aquaculture based on the con-4 . Strategic Option 4:
servation model.
It is interesting to note that, as far as mariculture is
concerned, this strategic option is hardly adoptable. Due to
the technical difficulties in cultivating fish in the sea,
major maricultures have developed only recently on the basis
of a rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge (instead of
the time-tested know-how of fish farmers), and it is certain
that researchers at modern laboratories will continue to play
the role of innovators, notwithstanding the importance of fish
farmers' experience in adapting such innovations to the local
environment. However, for small-scale, traditional fresh-water
cultures in ponds and lakes--particularly those characterized
by extensive farming methods and resultant low productivity,
practices like polyculture and aquaculture-agricultural inte-
gration has much to contribute. For this option the appro-
priate choice is a cooperative in which all the households in
a community participate, for a differentiated treatment of
aquaculturists and agriculturalists obviously makes little
sense.
A unique example of cooperative development on the con-
servation model is the "cooperation for survival" approach
advocated by Verhagen. Although in my opinion, the real value
of the "cooperation for survival" model lies elsewhere--i.e.,
in the formulation of "action-research" methods to uncover
the structure of the needs for cooperation- -the major premise
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of this approach is identical to the conservation model.
Verhagen writes:
Resources, however scarce, are seldom used
in an optimal way. Security offers no
guarantee against waste . In both the
Thai and Sri Lankan villages "micro projects"
were identified (in such fields as improved
water management, horticulture and others)
which would require no, or very limited re-
source input from outside . Mobiliz-
ing local resources, including locally
available knowledge, should be acknowledged
in theory and in practice, as a major
function of cooperative action and organ-
ization (1984, p. 22).
He further notes several specific guidelines for a rural devel -
opment program (1984, p. 16); among these are multiple and
intercropping systems as opposed to a sole cropping system;
subsistence production--in particular of the poor man's food
crops--as opposed to one-sided promotion of production for
markets; and conservation and rationalization of the use of
public lands, waters, and forests . Based on these typical
conservationist notions, he proposes to organize cooperatives
as issue-oriented functional groups in order to enhance the
capability of peasant farmers'self -defense. As he suggests,
any individual rural commun ity has a unique resource endowment
in terms of both quality and quantity; thus there is no uni-
form application method of the conservation model. When this
strategic option is chosen, the desirable activities of co -
operatives must be worked out uniquely in an individual com-
munity. In this respect, it would be correct to say that the
community-based, issue-oriented functional groups are probably
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the only feasible concept for cooperative development based
on the conservation model.
Potential Pitfalls
The cooperation for survival model is certainly a very
attractive approach for academicians, but it is probably just
the opposite for governments and development-assistance agen-
cies. -Be c a us e the needs and therefore the actual development
programs vary greatly in time and place, cooperative develop-
ment under this approach requires huge human resources--i.e .,
a large number of experienced researchers and qualified
officials who must be knowledgeable, sympathetic to the poor,
incorrupt, and competent enough to contrive programs to fulfill
the needs. I would like to leave it to the reader to judge
to what extent development agencies as well as developing
country governments can meet this requirement. Another poten -
tial pitfall is that the needs of every community would not
necessarily provide the chance for a cooperative, particularly
if the collective benefits gained by meeting the needs did
not clearly exceed the collective ,c os t s of doing so. Johnston
et ala (1982, p. 171) point out the fallacy of assuming that
.
the costs of participation for the rural poor are minimal;
cooperatives require "substantial and continuing investments
of time, energy, and personal freedom of action on the part
of participants." There is much room for discussion on whether
the cooperation for survival approach can counter the creeping
disincl ination for participation among rural people i f the
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approach fails to increase their well-being (their income
levels in particular), due to either a poor availab~lity of
local resources or an inadequate research capability.
5. Strategic Option 5: Develop capture fisheries based on
the induced innovation model.
Given the characteristics of the induced innovation model,
this strategic option will not be available for many develop-
ing countries unless their fisheries research substantially
improves. However, nowadays the inadequacy of national re-
search capabilities can to some extent be compensated by inter-
national technical aid, so let us not rule out the possibility
of building cooperatives under this option.
Table 2 includes three major fields in which future
research may be able to offer impressive breakthroughs:
culture-based fisheries, development of cost-saving technology,
and utilization of trash fish by-catches. Since innovations
related to the latter two will possibly be adopted with or
without cooperatives (though cooperatives can hasten the
process), let us concentrate on the first.
As I mentioned earlier, in Japan culture-based fisheries
have already become a reality. The Sarufutu Fisheries Coopera-
tive is one of the highly publicized "model cases." Sarufutu,
a small v illage located in northern Hokkaido, used to enjoy a
large scallop production, but later uncontrolled fishing shat -
tered this production and fishermen became extremely
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impoverished. During the 1960s, while Japan as a whole was
achieving unprecedented prosperity, fishermen in this village
scarcely shared the boom. Fishermen who could not afford to
leave remained in the village. In the early 1970s, they de-
cided to take the full gamble in order to convert to culture-
based fisheries, staking as much as 10 percent of their future
landings. They bought spats with borrowed money and released
them in one of four evenly divided areas of their fishing zone.
They did not even touch the area for the next four years,
despite further reductions in income which resulted from having
given up a quarter of their fishing grounds. The results of
their patience were production beyond the fishermen's wildest
expectations: it came to twenty times an average year's pro-
duction. Since then production has kept growing. When I
visited the village in 1983, per capita annual income of the
scallop fishermen ranged between u.S. $200,000 and $400,000.
However, the point here is not the fishermen's new wealth, but
how they became rich. We can identify three important compon -
ents in their success: (a) scientific management; (b) coopera-
tive initiative; and (c) collectivization of production. The
last is particularly interesting; the cooperative is no longer
a federation of independent fishermen but works virtually as
a single unit of production. The fishermen catch scallops
under the terms of an elaborated production schedule and a
daily norm decided jointly by the fishermen and the coopera-
tive management. Only four boats are allowed to engage in the
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fishery and all young fishermen have to spend several years
working in the cooperative on pre-production activities such
as seeding spat in the fishing ground before they can qualify
for the crews of the scallop boats. The cooperative also
establishes detailed rules on profit-sharing, according to
which boat owners, crews, and young fishermen in pre-production
activities receive their salaries. 5
As the above case study clearly indicates, in order for
fishermen to take full advantage of culture-based fisheries,
the conventional role of fisheries cooperatives as supporters
of independent producers may need to be replaced with a more
active role in which cooperatives are production entities in
themselves. For culture-based fisheries, pre- and post-
production become both unavoidable and indispensable because
the traditional concept of fishing--to catch fish--does not
make sense without activities such as seeding and the extermin-
ation of natural enemies. Moreover, the stricter degree of
fishing regulations necessitates the direct control of opera-
tions by cooperatives in place of mere coordination among
competing fishermen. Briefly, a key to this strategic option
lies in the organizational transformation from independent
fishing activities to an organic whole made up of inter-
dependent fishing activities through scientific control. The
collectivization of production in the framework of a coopera-
tive is one of the viable approaches in this direction.
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Potential Pitfalls
Chinese and Tanzanian experiences in peasant collective
farming demonstrate that collectivization has fatal defects
stemming from d is incentives and bureaucratic controls despite
an ideological justification for it (Putterman, 1985). Al-
though collective farming may be a better way to induce cooper-
atives when over-population in a community does not allow the
distribution of sufficient farmland to individual farmers, it
is widely accepted that collectivization is apt to cause in -
efficiency and resentment among peasants. There are two major
differences between the Chinese and Tanzanian collectivization
efforts and the successful Japanese examples described above .
First, in the Japanese case collectivization was planned at
the cooperative's initiative and with the fishermen's experi-
ence, not imposed by an external authority; thus they could
avoid many potential contradictions between the collectiviza-
tion plan and existing socio-cultural conditions. Second and
more important, collectivization in Sarufutu offered potential
benefits which were too great for the fishermen to ignore . By
contrast, collectivization in China and Tanzania failed to
provide attractive prospects, at least by peasant criteria. A
veteran fisherman of the Sarufutu Coqperative jokingly told me
it was not fun to work under somebody, but it is not likely
that the fishermen will dissolve collective production and
return to "exciting" - -but apparently devastating--free competi -
tion. Finally, we should remember that collectivization i n
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Sarufutu was possible only with the help of the newly avail-
ab l e technical package of culture-based fisheries. If devel -
oping countries cannot provide similar technical packages, to
imitate the Sarufutu model could cause further deterioration
of their SSF.
6. Strategic Option 6: Develop aquaculture based on the
induced innovation model.
This option does not necessarily require total or partial
collectivization of production, since an entire production
process can be controlled by an individual aquaculturist. Co -
operatives based on this option should instead consolidate
collective marketing, purchasing, and financing as an umbrella
organization for independent aquaculturists, as do ordinary
agricultural cooperatives in developed countries. This is not
to say that cooperatives are no longer required to coordinate
member act ivities; indeed aquaculture is not free from the
tragedy of common property. If everyone attempts to maximize
individual profits by raising the per unit density of fish in
an uncoordinated fashion, everyone will be worse off as a re -
sult of a deteriorating ecology and epidemics of fish disease .
However, the coordination of member activities would be a
relatively minor function of the cooperatives. The major sig-
nificance of this strategic option lies in its promising poten -
tial in terms of productivity, planability, and marketability,
which would enable cooperatives to fully exploit economies of
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scale in marketing and processing. Similarly, a uniformity
and predictability in the use of inputs--for instance, artifi -
cial feeds, medicine, or cage nets--would render ~he collective
supply very viable. These are business fields in which modern
cooperatives can display their maximum strength, and in this
respect the standard Western cooperative can be implanted
without much friction with local conditions.
Finally, it should be noted that this type of cooperative
often has to acquire research capability--or at least an
ability to respond quickly to technical innovations developed
in public research institutions--to survive the fierce competi -
tion with producers in other areas. This adds a new imperative
to cooperative management.
Potential Pitfalls
One pitfall for these cooperatives is the unavailability
of competent managerial personnel; as science-based aquaculture
itself, cooperative management under this option requires a
high level of expertise and entrepreneurship. Unfortunately,
unlike aquaculture techniques, there is no technical package
available for managerial skill, nor can low-level government
officials substitute for smart businessmen. We can predict
that the human factor could be a real bottleneck for the co -
operatives, taking into account the shortage of trained manage-
ment professionals in developing countries. Another pitfall
is that rational management often eventually collides with the
humanistic aspect of cooperatives. (We discussed this problem
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in Chapter I . ) This is a universal dilemma of the cooperative.
7. Strategic Option 7: Develop aquaculture based on the
biorevolution model.
For cooperative development, this option may not be much
different from Option 6. However, an interesting possibility
is the use of cooperatives as a part of public research activ-
ities. Specifically, cooperatives could be organized among
aquaculturists enlisted to experiment with new biotechnology
products. Cooperatives could supply new inputs from labora-
tories and foreign countries to members, mediate information
between inst itutions and members, disseminate new technology
to other aquaculturists, and gradually convert themselves i n t o
an economic organization for these pioneer aquaculturists. It
is not known for certain how many years will elapse before
biotechnology will start affecting primary industries in de -
veloping countries, positively or negatively. Some studies
forecast that biotechnology will become a compelling reality
for these countries by the end of this century; if so, it is
unrealistic to ignore a new possibility for cooperatives. I
omit the potential pitfalls for cooperatives in this option
as I am not confident of offering a plausible discussion on
this matter. However, I can say positively that technology
c a n solve many problems but obviously not all; cooperative
development calls upon a much wider spectrum of human efforts.
CHAPTER III
.OPERATI ONAL OPTIONS FOR
COOPERATIVES AND
CONCLUSIONS
OPERATIONAL OPTIONS
In Chapter II, we examined how cooperatives can be linked
to the overall strategy of fisheries development. However,
the seven strategic options we identified are no more than
coarse sketches of policy outlines within which the organiza-
tion and function of cooperatives have to be depicted in
detail. Indeed, strategic options alone scarcely provide the
necessary information to design actual fisheries cooperatives;
for this reason operational options need to be explored. Un-
like strategic options, operational options do not indicate
the general directions in which cooperatives must proceed, but
present various sets of options from which we can consciously
choose the most appropriate policy in a given environment . If
the first choice turns out to be inadequate in the process of
designing and implementing the cooperative programs, we can
correct the program by considering the second choice instead
of jumping to the conclusion that "cooperatives do not work ."
This is an incorporation of the process approach (as opposed
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to the blueprint approach) into cooperative development (ref;
p. 36) . The fo~lowing example helps illustrate this frame of
reference.
In Strategic Option 5 we noted that collectivization of
the production process must strike the keynote of cooperative
development, but this general guideline per se does not deter-
mine every aspect of proposed cooperatives. A free hand is
left in judging such matters as the following: whether col-
lectivization should be extended to a maximum extent by includ-
ing even non-fisheries production activities of communities;
conversely, whether it should keep as Iowa profile as possible
by introducing only a loose production agreement among boat
owners in a specific fishery; whether or not collectivization
should be achieved through a government's coercive action; and
whether new cooperatives should be organized solely for col-
lectivization or whether multipurpose cooperatives should per-
form this function as a part of their activities. There are
no universal answers 't o these questions, and therefore deci-
sions must be made on a case-by-case basis according to the
social, economic, and political conditions under which coopera-
tives exist. The best thing one can do is to be aware of the
range of available options and be prepared to make fresh
choices at each stage in the process of cooperative development.
We have to keep in mind two important aspects of opera-
tional options. First, operational options are not "this or
that" choices; rather a number of choices constitute a continuum
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between the two extremes and operational options in the real
world can be likened to a sliding scale between "this" and
"that." For instance, in the above example for collectiviza-
tion, it is apparent that many intermediary options are avail -
able between maximum and minimum collectivizations. There are
actually many partially collectivized fisheries cooperatives
in Japan (Shima et al., 1983). To simplify our argument, how-
ever, this section will discuss operational options mostly in
a dichotomous fashion. Second, the general independence of
the operational option from the strategic option does not rule
out the possibility that operational options are at times
narrowed down by strategic options.
Let us begin by examining operational options in the
following nine categories: size of cooperatives; membership;
compulsory membership; scope of activities; collectivization
of production; cooperation among cooperatives; traditional
organizations; pre-cooperatives; and violent confrontation.
It should be stressed that despite my preferences below for
particular policy choices in a general context, no choices are
absolutely superior to other choices without a consideration
of locality-specific conditions.
Operational Option 1: Size of Cooperatives
The fact that cooperatives have to meet two different
requirements--one on business profits and the other on human
considerations--makes it very difficult to determine an
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appropriate size for cooperatives in terms of membership. In
general, the business rationality justifies larger organiza-
tions to take advantage of economies of scale, but a member's
sense of participation diminishes in inverse proportion to
organization size. An average American fisheries cooperative
has about 100 members (NMFS, 1984). (The Point Judith Fisher-
men's Cooperative comprises about 200 fishermen.) In Japanese
marine fisheries cooperatives, the average number of active
members is estimated at around 100, though the registered
number exceeds 200 (Kase, 1985). The number of fishermen
affiliated with Korean fishing village societies (community-
based subgroups of regional cooperatives) is also reported at
about 100 (Eon-Soo, 1984). In Thailand, relatively successful
cooperatives of trawlers comprise about 150 members (Miyake,
1984). These statistics seem to suggest that the reasonable
number of members is in the range of 100 to 200. However, it
should not be forgotten that optimal cooperative size is a
dependent variable of per capita productivity, membership
qualifications, the size of communities, and the level of
managerial skill.
An important question associated with cooperative size
is whether a geographical area covered by a cooperative should
coincide with a traditional community. Of course, it would be
ideal if the two were identical, particularly if a community
traditionally exerts the exclusive fishing rights or is
ethnically different from neighboring communities. But often
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tradit ional commun i ties are too small to give cooperatives
adequate business opportunities. One of the possible solutions
to this d ilemma i s suggested by' the organizational structure
of Korean fisheries cooperatives: splitting the dual character
of the cooperatives into a community-based people's association
and a regional federation of such organizations. The regional
federation integrates many economic activities of the community
organizations into a single business enterprise. Cooperatives
based on this double-tier structure are probably very effective
in keeping fishermen from feeling apathetic and powerless,
problems which often undermine large, horizontally organized
cooperatives (Johnston et al., 1982, p. 188).
Operational Option 2: Membership
A great variety in the types of membership in fisheries
cooperatives can be classified into the following four cate-
gories in order of openness: (a) community residents; (b) fish-
ermen and other fisheries -related people; (c) fishermen; (d)
boat owners.
(a) Community residents
A cooperative composed of community residents is normally
called a community cooperative or village cooperative. If the
fishing population accounts for the predominant portion of
residents in a community, there is little harm in admitting
non-fishermen to a fisheries cooperative. Particularly if the
cooperative is intended to gain socio-political power for the
92
community, the restriction of membership may reduce those ex-
cluded to the rank of second-class citizens. Some cooperative
activities, such as the common purchase of horne necessities
and credit services, benefit non-fishermen as well. It was
suggested earlier that fishermen may be better off by being
included in agricultural cooperatives than being unorganized;
the same is true for non-fishermen in a fisheries cooperative.
Another merit of community resident membership is the possible
mobilization of rural intellectuals into the cooperative move-
ment. The Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement, a culturally and
spiritually oriented rural development effort in Sri Lanka,
was effective because it recruited village monks as community
development workers and used village temples as the center ,o f
activities (Korten, 1980). In the initial stages of coopera-
tives, village monks and schoolteachers, among the few educated
members of a community, often playa very important role in
enlightening villagers about cooperation. Finally, let us
recall that Strategic Option 4 renders a distinction between
fish farmers and other farmers almost meaningless; thus for
cooperatives based on that option, all have to be included.
(This is a typical case where strategic options restict opera-
tional options.)
(b) Fishermen and other fisheries-related people
Except for geographically isolated areas like small
islands, coastal communities usually embrace a substantial
agricultural population in addition to the fishing population.
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In such communities, it is desirable to organize fishermen and
farmers separately lest the difference of interests of the two
groups paralyzes cooperatives. However, the question still
remains of how to treat people who engage in fisheries-related
activities such as fish trading, boat building, and fish pro-
cessing.
The conventional wisdom is that cooperatives should not
be fooled by the Trojan Horse; i.e., once middlemen are admit-
ted into cooperatives, they will quickly dominate the coopera-
tives at the expense of the fishermen. Although this is a
useful guideline in most instances, competition among middle-
men, their social bonds with fishermen, and the expected
function of the cooperatives should be taken into consideration.
For the small-scale boat-builders and processors, cooperatives
may open the doors a little wider, provided that other organi-
zations such as occupational guilds and local commerce associa-
tions are not available to them.
(c) Fishermen
Fishermen membership is perhaps the most orthodox mem-
bership criterion of fisheries cooperatives, but various sets
of subcategories included in the general concept of "fishermen"
make the definition of actual membership complex. The sub-
categories include the following: part-time and full-time
fishermen; SSF and LSF fishermen; resident and nomad fishermen;
boat-owners, self-employed fishermen, and crews; capture fish-
ermen and aquaculturists; sport fishermen, sport fishing
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guides, and commercial fishermen; onshore, inshore and off-
shore fishermen; householder fishermen and semi-dependent
fishermen. There is obviously no one right formula to define
"fishermen membership"; it must be decided in each country;
in each region, or even in each cooperative. For instance,
the Japanese Fisheries Cooperative Law defines the qualifica-
tions for full membership i n the marine fisheries cooperatives
--a full member must engage in fisheries more than 90 days a
year and at the same time must reside in the jurisdictional
area of the cooperative. However, it is not uncommon that
the actual membership criteria of individual cooperatives dif-
fer from the legal definit ion due to explicit "grandfather
clauses" and the one-household, one-membership custom in
most communities. It is always a controversial point as to
who should be included in or excluded from cooperatives, but
it seems to me that one thing is certain: an egalitarian
i de o l o gy for cooperatives should not be overemphasized regard-
less of local rea*ities .
(d) Boat -owners
Boat-owner membership is one of the extremely narrow
defin itions of "fishermen membership," and because of its anti -
egalitarian appearance, boat-owner membership tends to be re -
garded as a degradation of the cooperative spirit. However,
boat -owner membership and d e facto boat-owner membership are a
widespread phenomenon throughout the world. Especially in
LSF, where the major ity of boat crews do not have immediate
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prospects of becoming boat -owners, boat-owner membership is a
rather common type of membership. On the one hand, if a com-
mercial fishing boat is assumed to constitute a single economic
interest, it is logical to conclude that the participation of
a boat-owner in a cooperative adequately represents the common
interests of fishermen working on the boat. On the other hand,
if we put the emphasis on the fundamental conflict of interests
between owners and crews, the best form of organizational ar -
rangement for crews is probably not the fisheries cooperative,
but a f ishermen's labor union. Meynell asks: "If the crew
still receive a share of the catch which has to be marketed
through the cooperative, then why should they not ~e [coopera-
tive] members too?" (1984, p. 30). In the same context I
would ask: Why should they bother being members? As long as
there is a social consensus that boat-owners represent the
comPFehensive interests associated with their boats, boat-owner
membership is one way to achieve cooperative objectives while
minimizing organizational confusion resulting from the inclu-
sion of crews.
Incidentally, differentiated membership is an intriguing
arrangement closely associated with the membership problem .
In Indonesia, there are two levels of membership- -that is, full
member and candidate member, according to the process of paying
for equity capital (Meynell, 1984). The membership of Japanese
fisheries cooperatives consists of proper members and associate
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members; it is intended in essence to accommodate part-time
fishermen in the latter category. In Norway, in order to en-
sure balanced representation, fisheries cooperatives have
adopted a unique system in which boat-owners, representatives
elected by crew members of each boat, and self-employed fisher-
men are classified into A-, B-, and C- members, respectively
(Grimley, 1950, p. 134).
In conclusion, various types of membership plus the use
of differentiated membership provide us a considerable range
of freedom in searching for the most suitable membership ar-
rangement for SSF cooperatives.
Operational Option 3: Compulsory Membership
The orthodox cooperative theories condemn a government's .
practice of compelling people to join cooperatives because
it is a departure from the principles of cooperatives (Dooren,
1982a, p. 84). In other words, compulsory membership, either
in law or in practice, is the very opposite of voluntary, open
membership, in which the tradition of West European coopera-
tives has been built. The motivated, active participation of
members is believed attainable only in democratic cooperatives
which guarantee people not only the right to join, but also
the right to secede from them. Another criticism against com-
pulsory membership points to the business inefficiency result-
ing from the monopolistic tendencies of cooperatives based on
compulsory membership. Lele notes that cotton processing
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cooperatives in Uganda "were able to continue operating regard-
less of the services they provided, or the costs they incurred"
(1981a, p. 60) because of the legalized absence of competition.
Nevertheless, the history of fisheries cooperatives in
some developed countries attests to the fact that compulsory
membership works very well under certain conditions. Let us
give Norwegian and Japanese examples. In Norway, the fisheries
cooperative movement gained great impetus in 1928, when the
government decided to grant fisheries cooperatives the exclu-
sive right to the first-hand sale of fish caught by both member
and non-member fishermen. Although non-member fishermen had
"freedom" to stay outside of the cooperatives, this government
action forced them to participate in the cooperatives in a
practical sense because being outside would not apparently be
of any benefit to them. This was certainly a ' c on t r ov e r s i a l
policy from the view-point of cooperative principles. But
we must emphasize the cautious, democratic process used in the
government to reach the final decision. The decision was made
only after a secret vote among the fishermen confirmed support
from a majority of the fishermen for the compulsory sales ar -
rangement (Grimley, 1950, p. 148). In Japan policymakers
invented an artful legal device for fisheries cooperatives:
one has to be a fisherman to belong to a cooperative, and at
the same time only cooperative members can be fishermen. The
cooperative is, therefore, an almost completely closed system .
The consequence of this pol icy is that fisheries cooperatives
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have included literally all the fishermen, and that fisheries
have been protected from the incursion of outsiders. Surpris-
ingly, until very recently this policy has never been subject
to any substantial controversies, and even today some concern
is expressed only for its implications to the environmental
movement, not for its validity as a fisheries policy per se.
This is because this virtually compulsory membership follows
the traditional customs of some fishing communities. Compul-
sory membership is also found in some developing countries.
In Mexico, shrimp is one of the species whose exploitation is
legally reserved for fisheries cooperatives. Although Mexican
fisheries cooperatives have been steeped in difficulties, their
problems are not directly attributable to compulsory membership
(McGoodwin, 1980; Szekely, 1983).
These national experiences undoubtedly indicate that
compulsory membership has the possibility of being an effective
operational option if it is used carefully and consistently
with fishermen's opinions and customs. However, it could be
disastrous if compulsory membership were imposed against the
fishermen's will.
Operational Option 4: Scope of Activities (Single-Purpose
versus Multipurpose Cooperat~ves)
Cooperative researchers have long been debating the
comparative advantages of single-purpose and multipurpose
cooperatives. Though we do not have enough space to review the
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debates thoroughly, the major pros and cons can be summarized
as follows (Dooren, 1982a, p. 77; Takigawa et al., 1973; Roy,
1981, p . 326):
Single-purpose cooperatives
Advantages
a. Single-purpose cooperatives are easy for managers
to run and easy for members to comprehend.
b. Single-purpose cooperatives can extract the
benefits of specialization by concentrating on
special products like shrimp for overseas
markets.
Disadvantages
a. In order to meet the multi-faceted needs of
fishermen, various single-purpose cooperatives
are required in a community.
b. Even if it is possible to set up several
cooperatives in a community, the overlaps in
their activities and excessive rivalry among
them are detrimental to members.
Multipurpose cooperatives
Advantages
a. Mutually beneficial effects are expected from
the different activities; e.g., cooperative
marketing helps cooperatives collect a repayment
of loans from fishermen.
b. The operation of several activities spreads
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overhead costs and business risks.
c . Multipurpose cooperatives can effectively
compete with multi-functional local middlemen.
Disadvantages
a. Higher management skill is required.
b. A distinction between profitable and unprofit-
able activities is difficult, particularly if
internal financing is allowed between activ-
ities.
Apparently, we have no single, absolute criterion with
which to prejudge the comparative desirability and feasibility
of the the two types of cooperatives. In fact, while many
European cooperatives (including fisheries cooperatives) have
developed in the single-purpose form, rural cooperative move-
ments in Japan and Korea have succeeded in building along multi-
purpose lines.
Operational Option 5: Collectivization of Production (or
Production Cooperatives)
We have already noted that once fisheries have reached
the stage of the induced innovation model, collectivization of
the production process becomes a viable as well as unavoidable
policy for cooperatives. Does this imply that collectiviza-
tion is not useful before that stage? As indicated in Chapter
II, the collectivization of peasants is, in general, very dif-
ficult due to peasants' hostility toward the communalization of
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their land, their apathy, disincent ives, managerial incapabil-
ity , and so forth. After studying the kibbutz (the typical
commune -type production cooperative in Israel) for its appli-
cability to developing countries, Kennes (1982) concludes that
the establishment of a similar system in developing countries
would be possible only if strong motivation based on religion
or nationalism provided the special environment. Dooren
(1982b) suggests three groups of people who could be exceptions
to the failure-ridden production cooperative: they are par -
ticularly ideologically or politically motivated people, land-
less farmers and sharecroppers who have nothing to lose, and
tribal peoples without a tradition of individual land-use.
As far as agriculture in developing countries is concerned,
the production cooperative is clearly an unpopular choice.
The production cooperative in SSF is by no means free from the
above problems. Yet, at the same time, it should be recognized
that fisheries have a higher possibility than agriculture of
maintaining successful production cooperatives for the follow -
ing reasons: fisheries resources are generally indivisible
(unlike farmland), and some coastal communities have tradition-
ally prohibited the individual utilization of fish resources.
Interestingly, Lesser (1974) reports that the only successful
fisheries cooperative in Guatemala is a production cooperative
based on the typical front ier model. The best policy is prob -
ably to take a very cautious stance toward collectivization
but not to rule out its possibility as an operational option.
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Operat ional Option 6: Cooperation among Cooperatives
Cooperat ion among cooperatives is one of the official
requirements called for by the International Cooperative
Alliance for all the cooperatives in the world. Beyond this
being a moralistic slogan, two partly overlapping problems
of cooperation need particular cons ideration in view of their
practical relevance to SSF cooperatives.
The first problem concerns the vertical integration of
primary cooperatives into second-tier organizations (usually
at the regional level) and third-tier apex organizations. Are
such umbrella organizat ions necessary for fisheries coopera-
tives in developing countries? A theory advocating such organ-
izations argues that as the primary cooperative itself is
intended to improve fishermen's socio-economic capabilities
through cooperation among individual fishermen, they must be
able to benefit more by extending coopertion to the regional
and national levels. For example, no matter how much political
clout is gained by fishermen in each cooperative, it will re -
main local and unable to infillence national fisheries policy
unless local powers are effectively combined at the national
level. However, the practicality of this theory is not always
guaranteed; a critical point is the cost-effectiveness of the
upper-tier organizations, which primary cooperatives have to
support if they fail to attain financial self-sufficiency. In
many developing countries, behind a beautifully drawn organiza-
tional chart of a national cooperative network, there is a
103
good posibility that these organizations will end up as white
elephants of a self-perpetuating cooperative bureaucracy.
Again, we have no ready-made answer about the desirable degree
of vertical integration of primary cooperatives. If we can
say someth~ng for sure, it must be to quote an ex-president of
the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative: "Rather than start -
ing an association for its own sake, the fisheries cooperatives
should first identify a specific function that such an associ-
ation could perform" (Dykstra, quoted by URI Marine Advisory
Service, 1972, p. 9).
The second problem is the promotion of cooperation be-
tween different kinds of cooperatives. In this regard, con -
sumers' cooperatives can be an important business partner for
fisheries cooperatives, especially when fisheries cooperatives
have to develop a new market as a result of increased produc-
tion or anti-cooperative sabotage by middlemen. There are
actually some successful cases of cooperation between consum-
ers' and fisheries cooperatives in developed countries, but in
developing countries, where the consumer movement has as yet
only a limited influence, such cooperation may provide no more
than moderate prospects for fisheries cooperatives. Nonethe-
less, cooperation with other cooperatives is worth keeping in
mind as a potential operational option for fisheries coopera-
tive development.
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Operational Option 7: Traditional Organizations
Rural communities probably with no exception have time-
honored communal organizations for mutual assistance. Through
such organizations, villagers exchange labor in production
activities, maintain village facilities like bridges and tem-
ples, and perform religious rituals. Although the traditional
organizations are different from the modern scope of activities
and the organizational principles of cooperatives, they all
share a spiritual backbone of self-help and cooperation. Some
believe that modern cooperatives can and must be built smoothly
on a foundation of traditional organizations, like grafting a
tree (Roth and Cliffeej cited by Obern et al., 1981). Japanese
fisheries cooperatives are the supporting evidence for this
argument: modern cooperatives were initiated by formalizing a
traditional community practice in resource management.
Pollnac (1982, p. 88) summarizes several other cases of the
successful formulation of fisheries cooperatives on the basis
of traditional organizations. However, the literature increas-
ingly suggests that such a policy lacks universal applicability
and warns of a dangerous tendency toward the idealization of
traditional organizations (Lele, 1981aj Obern et al., 1981).
Hunter writes that the modern cooperative "involves differ-
ent kinds of action, for different purposes, by people in
different relationships with each other, from the kinds of
action, purpose and relationship enshrined in traditional co-
operative activity" (quoted by Johnston et al., 1982, p. 166).
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With these contradictory theories, it seems useless to gener-
alize policy in terms of traditional organizations. Until
more studies lead to consensus among researchers, let us ten-
tatively conclude that although the use of the traditional
organization has been relegated to second place, we should not
completely abandon this operational option.
Operational Option 8: Pre-cooperatives
The pre-cooperative is an issue firmly connected with,
but not quite the same as, the issue of the traditional organ -
ization. Cooperative development experience since colonial
rule suggests that the full-fledged "registered cooperative,"
a copy of the Western cooperative notion, is often too compli -
cated and advanced to introduce into a peasant society. In
fact, many developing countries have given up on the immediate
creation of full -scale cooperatives and have instead begun
promoting small, informal, training-oriented cooperative groups
called pre-cooperatives or functional cooperatives. For in -
stance, Thailand presently has 109 fishermen's groups in addi -
tion to 20 fisheries cooperatives. The Thai government thinks
that fishermen's groups will foster cooperative consciousness
and management knowledge among fishermen so that the groups
will later progress to full-fledged cooperatives (Miyake,
1984) . Similarly, the Philippines recomposed its cooperative
plan in 1973, adopting pre-cooperatives called Samahang Nayon,
which are initiatory organizations before the introduction of
full -fledged cooperatives.
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SamahangNayons carry out technical
training, cooperative education, savings promotion, and some
business arrangements between members and merchants. When
Samahang Nayons successfully complete these programs, ten of
them will collectively set up one Area Marketing Cooperative
(Miyake, 1984).
The" pre-cooperative approach seems to be a realistic and
useful operational option. Yet so far pre-cooperatives in both
Thailand and the Philippines have not recorded any major
achievements, nor are they always welcomed by fishermen. In
Grenada the length of time required for the pre-cooperative
stage has disillusioned fishermen and thus adversely affected
cooperative development (Epple, cited by Pollnac, 1982, p. 91).
The pre-cooperative is not an obvious panacea, but I believe it
has had an impact upon policymakers obsessed with the European
cooperative model, and it has a good chance of developing into
the mainstream approach in the future .
Operational Option 9: Violent Confrontation
Let us here consider whether violent confrontation with
the anti-cooperativism of vested interests is a permissible
tactic for developing cooperatives. One fundamental criticism
of the cooperative development program is that the cooperative
alone cannot change the exploitative structure of a rural
society unless cooperatives are consciously used as a weapon
in class struggle and social change (Maslennikov, 1983, p. 43).
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In this view, violent measures in the process of organizing
cooperatives may be justified. Although I do not de ny the
inevitability of revolutionary social c hange or t he so-called
"pe a s a n t war " strategy in extremely oppressive political
regimes, s uch a radical view is often irresponsible for t he
following reasons:
(a) The process of violent social change, co ntrary to
t he optimistic prospects of "p r o gr e s s i v e" ideolo-
gists , devastates the rural poor as well as the
rich (look at Ca mbodia a nd Afghan i s t an) .
(b) As symbolized by the decline of African socialism,
an equitable distribution of wealth makes little
difference to the rural poor whe n the size of t he
"pie " remains tiny.
(c) It is virt ually i mpossible not only for We s t e r n
development assistance agencies , but also for multi-
lateral aid organizations a nd socialist countries
to be involved in such a politically volatile issue
without causing serious diplomatic trouble .
However , all this is not to say t hat cooperative develop -
ment has nothing to do with coercive group pressures or even
skirmishes against vested interests. Violent confrontation is
a topic n o one likes to discuss , bu t it is sometimes an un -
avoidable reality in the cooperative building process . Once
violent reaction takes place or is imminent, cooperative work-
ers as well as fishermen will find themselves forced to choose
108
a pol icy ranging from an outright physical confrontation to
nonresistance. I endorse a limited degree of militancy against
externa~ sabotage, part icularly if the opposition itself em-
ploys violent measures. Of course, violence is always vicious,
but i t i s a wishful self -delus ion to believe that cooperatives
are free from hostility and violent challenge. As the history
of the labor movement shows, the collective direct action of
fishermen is occasionally a necessary self-defense for the
cooperative movement.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have focused the discussion on two
questions: why fisheries cooperatives have failed miserably
in developing countries and how they can be restructured in
the future. First, we analyzed numerous difficulties confront-
ing past cooperative development efforts from three different
angles: the particularity of the fishing industry, limitations
of the cooperative, and fallacies in the policy framework.
Second, since the first two angles are independent variables
for policymakers--that is, policymakers cannot readily change
either the nature of the fishing industry or the mechanisms
i nhe r e n t to the cooperative- -it was proposed that the policy
framework (which is the only variable we can control) be re-
composed by introducing the concepts of the strategic option
and operational option. The strategic option is derived from
the logic that the development policy of the fisheries coopera-
tive must be based on and consistent with the overall strategy
of fisheries development. My impression is that past coopera-
tives were often based on strange policies--such as that fish -
eries policy as a whole is directed to LSF development, and
cooperatives alone targe~ SSF, or that cooperatives are de-
signed as distributors of subsidy and loans for boats and gear
when proper resource management is urgently needed. The in-
troduct ion of the strategic option is intended to prevent a
disparity between the fisheries development strategy and the
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cooperative policy by designing the latter on the foundations
of the former. The strategic option provides a useful start-
ing point from which national policymakers, development work-
ers, and the target fishermen groups interactively shape co-
operatives through a trial-and-error process. In this second
stage of cooperative development, the operational option
becomes necessary for choosing the most suitable organizational
format in given local conditions. If cooperatives are rigidly
preplanned, contrary to the wide range of flexibility suggested
by the operational option, the cooperatives have little chance
of stimulating the active participation of fishermen. I be -
lieve that in the past many policymakers were preoccupied right
from the start with a particular image of the cooperative- -
mostly a relatively large, full-fledged, multipurpose coopera-
tive made up of independent full-time fishermen. In addition,
they probably did not pay proper regard to traditional organi-
zations and cooperation with other cooperatives. However, it
is entirely possible to perceive of a small, traditional-
organization-based pre-cooperative whose only activity is
shipping of fish to consumers' cooperatives for the convenience
of both full- and part-time fishermen. Between and beyond
these two formats, it should be remembered, there is an unac-
countable number of combinations of operational options, so it
is nothing more than the narrowness of policymakers (not of
fishermen, to whom policymakers often attribute failures) to
jump to the conclusion that cooperatives are not feasible when
111
the i r preconceived cooperatives do not work. I am suggesting
not that the operational option can provide easy how-to skills
for cooperative development, but rather that our struggle with
complex cooperative issues could be more productive if we were
aware of the range of possible choices.
I expect two criticisms to the approach proposed in this
paper. One is probably about "excessive" production-oriented-
ness in setting a starting point for cooperative development
on the strategic option (production-related, income-generating
factors). The other one can be a lack of an analysis of "human
factors" which brings real results from an elaborated plan.
Although a thorough discussion of these criticisms exceeds the
scope of this paper, let us briefly reply to both.
Admittedly, it is a legitimate argument that "economic
growth" is not always interchangeable with a multi-dimensional
notion of "development"; growth can hardly be called develop-
ment if only a small segment of the population benefits from
it. In fact, the dilemma of growth and equity has been and
will continue to be a central issue in development theories.
Unfortunately, no development theory has fully succeeded in
reconciling the two imperatives. In the context of the growth-
equity dilemma, the cooperative is generally considered to
stand on the side of equity. The rural cooperative has been
advocated for its egalitarianism as a remedy to socio-economic
differentiation, which has been created by the infiltration
of a monetized economy into the peasant society dividing the
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"have's" and "have-nots." However, an overemphasis on the
equitable distribution of income as the objective of coopera-
tives often leads to the equitable distribution of poverty.
Without a strong ideology to justify cooperatives, therefore,
not only do the most efficient f ishermen look upon them with
disfavor (Pollnac, 1981, p . 30), but also a majority of them
r espond only passively to cooperatives. "Participat ion" is a
shining word, but partic ipation is always expensive to those
who participate; participants have to sacrifice time and energy,
be responsible for joint decisions, and even dare have a dis -
tasteful argument with n~ighbors (Johnston et al., 1982, p .
17 2). Examples are omnipresent in our own daily lives: a
student may not care at all about a student cooperative
assembly, the notice for which he found in his mailbox; a
family may not change picnic plans when the election of a com -
munity council turns out to be on the same day as the picnic.
Why? The costs of participation for the would-be participants
are disproportionately high when weighed against the benefits .
However, the same student may attend the assembly if its agenda
includes the closure of a cooperative book store where he fre -
quently buys . The family may cancel i t s picnic plans if a
relative of theirs is running for the council . Why? Because
the increased benefits of participat ion now balance the costs .
If these are realities i n a society i n which we live, why does
the same rule not apply to peasant fishermen's participation
in cooperatives? I have repeatedly noted that cooperative
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development must be attempted on an infrastructure of production-
related, income-generating factors because these factors, and
only these factors in a general perspective, can enhance the
benefits of participation for fishermen. We have identified
several development models for capture fisheries and aquacul -
ture. They are the engines for SSF development, and coopera-
tives must be the vehicles to accommodate such engines. Fish-
eries cooperatives cannot afford to be restricted to a direct
anti-poverty program, particularly if in many developing coun-
tries fisheries, together with agriculture, ought to lead off
national development.
So far I have intentionally avoided substantial discus-
sion about the human factor, but this does not mean that it
does not affect the outcome of cooperative development. On
the contrary, the nature of cooperatives as people's associa-
tions makes the human factor considerably influential in deter-
mining the success or failure of cooperatives. Even in a hos-
tile environment, those who have strong ideological, religious,
or ethical motivations often manage to produce successful co-
operatives, and vice versa. Besides social motivations, ele-
ments such as people's character, intelligence, skill, industry,
and discipline bring about far different results with coopera-
tives in the same environment. The most significant manifesta-
tion of the human factor in rural cooperatives is the quality
of local leadership. Although a growing body of literature
suggests that traditional patron/client relationships once
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ubiquitous between rural elites and peasants are in the process
of breaking down (Korten, 1980; Verhagen, 1984, p. 14), this
does not mean that rural elites are withdrawing from a domin-
ant position in cooperatives. Some recommend that cooperative
development policy bypass rural elites and build new leadership
among peasants in order not to allow a "distortion" of the
cooperatives by elites in their own favor (Young et al., 1981,
p. 32). Some are skeptical about the practicality of such an
approach in view of the little experience and knowledge that
peasants have about modern organization and their inclination
toward dependency. Historical evidence from many developed
countries also shows that rural elites rather than small farm-
ers played a crucial role in the early stages of rural coopera-
tives (Johnston et al., 1982, p. 167; Dooren, 1982a, p. 37).
Johnston and Clark aptly summarize the sharp division of re-
searchers' opinions over the leadership problem:
Some analysts conclude that a major obstacle
to greater participation by the poor is the
existence of strong, antiegalitarian local
elites; others conclude that effective par-
ticipation requires strong, grass-roots lead-
ership, which when present at all usually
emerges from the rank of the elite (1982, p.
169).
In practice, a judgment of the egalitarianism (or anti-
egalitarianism) of rural elite leadership is bound to the sub-
jective value systems of individual researchers. I believe
these are two sides of the same coin: the margin between
"grass-roots leaders" who are authoritative caretakers of
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communities and "local elites" who are authoritarian rulers of
communities is much narrower than it appears at first glance.
This is the background for my decision not to include human
factors, especially leadership, among the operational options.
Above all, the subtleties and subjectivity reflected in the
human factor problem render a dichotomous discussion extremely
misleading beyond the reasonable limits of simplification.
Finally, I would like to make a short comment about the
future of fisheries cooperative studies. It has not been un -
common for me to hear quite polarized opinions about fisheries
cooperatives in conversations with fisheries development ex-
perts and government officials from developing countries. Some
have overly optimistic opinions about both the feasibility and
desirability of fisheries cooperatives on the simple ground
that the fishing industry in developed countries has such in-
stitutions. More often, however, they categorically express
pessimistic views based on their experience. It seems to me
that these polarized opinions are replicas of cooperative
optimism in the 1950's and 1960's and cooperative pessimism
since the 1970's. As we have discussed, the fisheries coopera-
tive is neither a panacea nor a false medicine; it is just an
ordinary medicine that is effective if the right patients take
it in the right way. But such misunderstandings about coopera-
tives cannot simply be eliminated by one-way communications
from cooperative specialists to other fisheries experts.
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Reasons: (a) There are probably no more than 20 specialists
actively working on international fisheries cooperative develop-
ment throughout the world; (b) More important, as this study
has suggested, the design of cooperatives in the future will
need more and more technological information and interdisciplin-
ary research. The problem of fisheries cooperatives cannot
afford to be the back yard of a few specialists, so it is hoped
that many other fisheries experts, such as technologists,
biologists, and economists, will come to share the basic idea
that the fisheries cooperative has both effectiveness and
limitations.
The exchange of experiences and views between Westerners
and Easterners is another important factor for future fisheries
cooperative studies. Surprisingly, despite the fact that Japan
has the most advanced fisheries cooperative system in terms of
scale and sophistication of activities, Japan has never been
involved in a fisheries cooperative development project in the
developing world. More regrettably, information aoout Japanese
fisheries cooperatives is scarcely available to the rest of
the world. The academic standard of fisheries cooperative
studies in Japan is by no means mediocre, but research is for
the most part confined to the domestic field and thus has a
limited international perspective. Language is obviously the
largest obstacle to communication between Japanese specialists
and their counterparts in other countries. Even within the
constraints posed by language, however, far less Japanese
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research is available in international circles than would seem
justified. Japanese cooperative development, in a different
historical path from that of the West, has significant implica-
tions for the cooperative problem in developing countries.
This is also true for Korean cooperatives. I believe that a
constant exchange of experiences between Western and Eastern
specialists will help rectify a long-time so-called Western
bias in international cooperative development. (It is import-
ant to stress that my suggestion is not that the Japanese co -
operative model become a new dogma replacing the European
model. )
A third channel of cooperative efforts, which is even
more important than the previous two, should be developed be-
tween practioners in developing countries and specialists ·i n
developed countries. Even after three decades of fisheries
cooperative development in developing countries, an overwhelm-
ing portion of literature is still written by Western special-
ists. Of the few papers from developing countries, most are
official reports written by either officers of fisheries
agencies or semi-governmental national cooperative organiza -
tions. These reports often contain stereotyped cooperative
rhetoric, statements of national commitment, neat organization-
al charts, and questionable statistics, but little information
about the realities of their cooperatives. This sometimes
appears to be because the governments and cooperative organiza-
tions themselves do not have much information rather than
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because they are making "face-saving" efforts. It is obvious,
however, that national practioners can communicate with fisher-
men and understand local conditions much more effectively than
foreign specialists. Fisheries cooperative studies need
detailed information from the national practitioners. The one-
way flow of information from developed countries to developing
countries must be corrected by increasing feedback information
and dialogue among people from every corner of the world.
The tasks ahead for fisheries cooperative studies are
daunting, but there is no reason to doubt a reward for our
struggles: As long as people keep on seeking conciliation
between humanity and economic reality, opportunities for the
cooperative will never cease to exist. A new cooperative
realism can and should supercede the ungrounded optimism and
pessimism of the past.
NOTES
lover the years, a number of different definitions have
been given of the cooperative (see, for example, Roy, 1981).
In this paper, the concept of the cooperative includes both
the official and semi-official forms of cooperative organiza-
tion such as pre-cooperatives but excludes traditional com-
munity organizations (ref. Chapter III).
2Neither the Rochdale principles nor modern cooperative
principles formalized by the International Cooperative Alliance
make mention of means to develop cooperatives. But there has
been implicit agreement among practitioners on the evolutional
and peaceful process in building cooperatives. Except in case
of self-defense, the cooperative movement does not employ
violent means (ref. Chapter III, Operational Option 9).
3Fo r a critical appraisal of past rural credit projects
in developing countries see Adams et al., 1981.
4Lesser (1974) provides an intriguing Guatemalan example
of SSF cooperative development based on the frontier model.
SFor those who can read Japanese, the detailed informa-
tion about Sarufutu Fisheries Cooperative is given by Shima,
1979, 1981.
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